THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. THIS MATTER IS BEFORE THE COURT, PURSUANT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S REQUEST FOR AN ADVISORY OPINION. MR. THOMSON AND MR. ANTONACCHI WILL ARGUE IN FAVOR OF THE OPINION AND ITS OPPONENTS MR. HARRIS AND MR. McLENDON. I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE A BRIEF STATEMENT REGARDING THE AMENDMENT. IN HIS LETTER TO THE COURT, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT MIGHT BE RULED DEFECTIVE ON A NUMBER OF GROUNDS, BUT I THINK THAT THE MOST OBVIOUS DEFECT IN NEED OF THE COURT'S ATTENTION IS THAT IT IS ACTUALLY TWO AMENDMENTS THAT AFFECT DIFFERENT FUNCTIONS OF GOVERNMENT. FIRST, IT AUTHORIZES VOTER APPROVAL OF SLOT MACHINES AND REGULATION THERE OF, AND SECONDLY, IT AMENDS, WITHOUT SAYING SO, ANOTHER SECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT LIMITS THE IMPOSITION OF NEW TAXES BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT. THAT IS ARTICLE I ARTICLE II SECTION 7 WHICH REQUIRES A TWO-THIRDS APPROVAL BY VOTERS. THAT FORM IS NOT EFFECTIVELY RENDERED MEANINGLESS BY A PROPOSAL SUCH AS THIS THAT PURPORTS TO PASS BY AN EFFECTIVE VOTE.

IS THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT IMPOSEING A TAX, OR IS IT GIVING THE AUTHORITY TO THE LEGISLATURE TO IMPOSE A TAX?

I WOULD SUBMIT THAT IT IS IMPOSING A TAX, AND MR. HERRON IS GOING TO ARGUE THIS AT SOME LENGTH, AND I DON'T WANT TO CUT INTO HIS TIME, BUT WE WOULD AGREE THAT IT EFFECTIVELY IMPOSES A TAX. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: AS I UNDERSTAND THE WAY WE ARE PROCEEDING HERE IS THAT MR. THOMSON IS GOING TO PRESENT THE VIEW IN FAVOR OF THIS INITIATIVE, CORRECT? AND YOU HAVE TWO MINUTES OF THEIR TIME OR THE OPPONENTS.

THAT'S CORRECT. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: ALL RIGHT. MR. THOMSON.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE, MEMBERS OF THE COURT. PARKER THOMSON APPEARING FOR THE PROPONENTS OF THE INITIATIVE PETITION. I WILL GIVE DIRECT ARGUMENT, AND MR. ANTONACCI WILL HANDLE THE REBUTTAL END. WE HAVE RESERVED FIVE MINUTES FOR THAT PURPOSE.

COULD YOU RESTATE THE PRECISE RULE OF THIS COURT, INSOFAR AS REVIEWING THE PROPOSALS FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT?

YES, JUSTICE ANSTEAD. THE SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA HAS AN OBLIGATION, UNDER THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, AND UNDER THE APPLICABLE LAW TO DO TWO THINGS, FIRST TO DETERMINE IF IT IS A SINGLE SUBJECT, WHICH IS REQUIRED FOR ALL INITIATIVE PETITIONS, AND THE REASONS FOR THAT IS THIS COURT HAS REPEATEDLY SAID IT IS THE BASIS OF THE PROCESS UNDER WHICH INITIATIVE PETITIONS ARE PRESENTED TO THE COURT. THAT IS DIRECTLY IN EFFECT TO THE PEOPLE, RATHER THAN BEING SHELTERED THROUGH A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OR THE LEGISLATURE, AND THE SECOND IS THAT THE SUMMARY BE A FAIR DESCRIPTION OF THE CHIEF PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED AMENDMENT, AND THAT IS THE STATUTORY REQUIREMENT, SUMMARY, OF COURSE, TO BE A MAXIMUM OF 75 WORDS, AND THE COURT HAS OBSERVED THE LIMITATIONS OF THOSE NECESSARILY NUMBERICAL LIMIT IMPOSES ON THE DESCRIPTION THAT CAN BE IN THE SUMMARY, BUT THAT IS THE COURT'S PURPOSE, ONE SINGLE SUBJECT, AND TWO, FAIRNESS OF TITLE AND SUMMARY. I WILL DIRECT MYSELF, FIRST, TO THE STATEMENT THAT WAS MADE BY ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL HUBENER, WITH RESPECT TO THE APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE II, SECTION 7, THE CHIEF PURPOSE OF THE PROPOSED INATHATIVE PETITION IS TO AUTHORIZE SLOT MACHINES WITHIN EXISTING STATE LICENSED PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES. THAT IS EXISTING FACILITIES THAT THE STATE HAS ALREADY LICENSED TO EXIST, IN COUNTIES WHERE, AUTHORIZED BY VOTE OF THE ELECTORATE. THERE ARE TWO IMPLEMENTATIONS. THE LEGISLATURE IS DIRECTED TO IMPLEMENT THE LICENSING REGULATION AND TAXATION OF THESE SLOT MACHINE REVENUES THAT WILL BE DERIVED FROM THE SOURCE, ASSUMING IT IS A PASSAGE WAY.

CAN WE GO TO THE LEGISLATION FOR THE DEFINITION OF A SLOT MACHINE? FOR INSTANCE, IS A COIN-OPERATED VIDEO GAMING MACHINE, IS THAT A SLOT MACHINE, WITHIN THE DEFINITION?

I BELIEVE IT IS, YOUR HONOR. THE LEGISLATURE HAS DEFINED A SLOT MACHINE, FOR A LONG TIME, AS MR. McLENDON HAS OBSERVED THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF LITIGATION ABOUT WHAT A SLOT MACHINE IS, AND HIS COMPLAINT IS THAT THE DEFINITION THAT THE LEGISLATURE HAS APPLIED IS TOO BROAD. IT IS BROAD, AND THEREFORE I BELIEVE IT WOULD ENCOMPASS THE ACTIVITY THAT YOU SPOKE OF. VERY OFTEN, WITH CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS BY INITIATIVE, THE COURT HAS NECESSARILY LOOKED, BOTH IN PROVING OR DISPROVING IT THE LEGISLATIVE DEFINITIONS THAT PREEXISTED THE PROPOSAL OF THAT PARTICULAR AMENDMENT.

SO THEORETICALLY YOU COULD PLAY THIS FROM YOUR HOME, IF THE MACHINE WAS IN AN AUTHORIZED FACILITY.

NO. IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, IT WOULD BE UP TO THE LEGISLATURE TO IMPLEMENT IT, BUT THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT IS SLOT MACHINES ON THE PREMISE OF EXISTING LICENSED PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES. THAT IS WHAT THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION CALLS FOR. THEN IT ASKS, THEN IT REQUIRES THE LEGISLATURE TO IMPLEMENT, AND OBVIOUSLY THE LEGISLATURE WILL HAVE TO IMPLEMENT IN A REASONABLE AND LEGAL FASHION, WHICH, OF COURSE, CAN BE TESTED IN COURT. THE SECOND IMPLEMENTATION IS THE COUNTY REFERENDUM THAT WOULD BE CALLED BY THE COUNTY COMMISSION AND THE PARTICULAR, IN THE PARTICULAR COUNTIES WHICH MAY HAVE SUCH PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES. THERE IS A CLARIFICATION, WITH RESPECT TO THE AMENDMENT, THAT ARTICLE I II SECTION -- ARTICLE II SECTION 7 DOES NOT APPLY, AND IN ARTICLE II SECTION 7, THE PROPONENTS' AMENDMENT DOESN'T APPLY, BY ITS OWN TERMS, AS CONSTRUED BY THIS COURT IN THE APPROVAL.

WHEN YOU SAY ARTICLE II SECTION 7 DOESN'T APPLY, WHAT ARE WE TALKING ABOUT IT DOESN'T APPLY? IT DOES NOT APPLY TO THE INITIAL PASSAGE OF THIS AMENDMENT OR TO THAT PORTION, IF THE COUNTY DOES A REFERENDUM AND OFFERS IT TO THE PUBLIC.

IT DOESN'T APPLY AT ANY TIME, YOUR HONOR, AND THE REASON IS, AS THIS COURT HAD DETERMINED, BEFORE PERMITTING IT TO GO TO THE ELECTORATE JUST FIVE YEARS AGO, THAT ELECTION ONLY APPLIES TO NEW CONSTITUTIONALLY-ADOPTED TAXES THAT ARE ADOPTED WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT THAT MIGHT BE PROPOSED BY INITIATIVE PETITION. AS THIS COURT OBSERVED, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL RAISED THE QUESTION, WELL, DOES THAT MEAN IT WOULD APPLY TO LEGISLATIVELY LEGISLATIVELY-CREATED TAXES, WHICH ARE, IN FACT, IMPOSEED, PURSUANT TO AUTHORITY GRANTED TO THE LEGISLATION BY THE CONSTITUTION, AND THIS COURT, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE ARGUMENTS WHICH WE HAVE QUOTED IN OUR BRIEF, OF BOTH THE PROPONENTS AND THE OPPONENTS, SAID, NO, IT DOESN'T. IT SAID, THIS COURT SAID THAT THE TERMS OF THE BALLOT, TITLE AND SUMMARY, CLEARLY CONVEY THAT IF THE TAX OR FEE IN QUESTION IS NOT IMPOSEED BY CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, AND THEN THESE ARE THE COURT'S WORDS IN THE PARENTHESIS, AS WOULD BE THE CASE IF THE TAX OR FEE WERE LEGISLATIVELY IMPOSEED, THEN A TWO-THIRDS VOTE OF THE ELECTORATE IS NOT REQUIRED. THE ONLY TAXES THAT ARE REACHED BY THAT PROVISION, BY ITS TERMS, BY THIS COURT'S INTERPRETATION, AND BY THE CONTENTIONS OF BOTH BOTH PROPONENTS AND ITS OPPONENTS, ARE THAT IT REACHES ONLY ONES SUCH AS A SUGAR FEE, THAT ARE IMPOSEED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT PROVISION, ITSELF. THAT IS WHAT IT WAS DIRECTED AT.

SO WHAT DOES THE LANGUAGE IN THIS PROPOSED AMENDMENT, WHICH SAYS THAT THE LEGISLATURE, BY GENERAL LAW, SHALL IMPLEMENT THIS SECTION WITH LEGISLATION TO LICENSE, REGULATE, AND TAX SLOT MACHINES? WHAT DOES THAT PARTICULAR LANGUAGE MEAN?

IT IS THE DIFFERENCE, YOUR HONOR, BETWEEN THE IMPOSITION OF THE TAX AND THE CREATION OF AN ADDITIONAL SUBJECT OF TAXATION, WHICH IS THE REVENUES THAT WOULD BE GENERATED BY SLOT MACHINES. A YEAR AGO, THIS COURT APPROVED THE AMENDMENT ON THE MONORAIL. THE MONORAIL, ASSUMEEDLY, WILL GENERATE ADDITIONAL FEES, IF GOVERNMENTLY-OWNED, OR IT WILL GENERATE ADDITIONAL TAX REVENUES IF PRIVATELY-OPENED, BOTH OF WHICH ARE PERMITTED BY THAT AMENDMENT, AND BOTH WILL BE APPROPRIATED, AS THE AMENDMENT REQUIRES BY THE LEGISLATURE. IT, HOWEVER, IS NOT SUBJECT TO ARTICLE II SECTION 10, BECAUSE THE MONORAIL AMENDMENT DOES THOUGHT IMPOSE A TAX -- DOES NOT IMPOSE A TAX.

BUT THIS DOES NOT GIVE ANY DISCRETION TO THE LEGISLATURE TO IMPOSE A TAX OR NOT, CORRECT? THE LANGUAGE SAYS THE LEGISLATURE SHALL DO THIS.

IT REQUIRES THE LEGISLATURE TO IMPOSE SOME TAX. IT DOESN'T SAY WHAT TAX THE LEGISLATURE MAY EXPAND THE EXISTING PARI-MUTUEL TAX, IT MAY APPLY A CORPORATE INCOME TAX, A SALES TAX, A GROSS RECEIPTS TAX, ANY TAX THAT IT IS LAWFULLY REQUIRED TO APPLY, AND IT WILL -- EXCUSE ME.

I KNOW YOU HAVE A LIMITED TIME, BUT IF WE DECIDE THIS IS A CONSTITUTIONAL TAX, THEN THERE IS A SINGLE SUBJECT VIOLATION?

NO, YOUR HONOR. WE DO NOT AGREE TO THAT. MR. ANTONACCI HAS TAKEN THE POSITION, IN SUPPORT OF THE PETITION, THAT IT STILL FALLS UNDER THE LIMITED CASINO CASE, THE FLORIDIANS AGAINST CASE OF 1978, THE LIMITED CASINOS CASE OF 1994, THE LOCAL OPTION CASE OF 1995. IF IT CALLS -- IF IT FALLS WITHIN THE SINGLE PURPOSE, AS AN IMPLEMENTATION PROVISION, THAT IT WAS APPLIED IN ALL OF THOSE CASES, EACH OF WHICH REQUIRED, THE WORD WAS "SHALL" IN EACH OF THOSE CASES, REQUIRED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THOSE GAMING REVENUES, TO BE REGULATED AND TAXED BY THE LEGISLATURE, AND IN FLORIDIANS AGAINST, SPECIFICALLY DIRECTED WHERE THOSE REVENUES SHOULD BE APPROPRIATED TO, AND IN THAT CASE IT WAS EDUCATION AND/OR LAW ENFORCEMENT. SO THAT UNDER THE EXISTING CONTROLLING LAW OF THIS COURT IN 1994 AND 1995, REACHING BACK TO 1978, THIS COURT HAS FOUND THAT, WITHIN THE SINGLE CHIEF PURPOSE IMPLEMENTATION, TRUE TAXATION REQUIRED OF THE LEGISLATURE IS PART OF THE SINGLE SUBJECT. AND I WOULD POINT OUT TO THE COURT THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PRIOR DECISIONS OF THIS COURT. JUSTICE OVERTON, AND CERTAIN OTHER JUSTICES OF THIS COURT, HAVE, OVER THE YEARS, SPOKEN TO A REQUEST THAT THE LEGISLATURE AUTHORIZED THE SECRETARY OF STATE OR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OR SOMEBODY ELSE TO WORK ON DRAFTING, AND THE LEGISLATURE HAS DECLINED TO DO IT, SO THIS COURT HAS OBSERVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD LOOK TO THE DECISIONS OF THIS COURT, AS A GUIDE TO DRAFTING, SO THAT WHAT CAME BEFORE THIS COURT WOULD BE SOMETHING THAT HAD BEEN PREVIOUSLY BEFORE THE COURT, CONSIDERED BY THE COURTc AND RULED ON BY THE COURT, AND THAT IS EXACTLY WHAT THE PETITIONERS IN THIS CASE DID. THEY LOOKED TO FLORIDIANS AGAINST, WHICH WAS IN 1978, BEFORE THERE WAS SOME CHANGE IN THE LAW IN 1984, BUT "FLORIDIANS AGAINST" WAS SPECIFICALLY QUOTED AND WITH RESPECT TO THIS LANGUAGE, BEING CASINOS IN 1995 AND AGAIN APPROVED IN 1994 AND AGAIN APPROVED IN 1995. THAT IS WHAT THE LAW HAS CREATED IN THIS STATE, BY THIS COURT, IS THAT SINGLE-PURPOSE, INCLUDES IMPLEMENTATION THROUGH REGULATION AND TAXATION. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: JUSTICE SHAH HAD A QUESTION.

YOU MENTIONED EARLIER, IN RESPONSE TO JUSTICE ANSTEAD'S QUESTION, THE LIMITED ROLE OF THIS COURT. SHOULD WE BE CONCERNED THAT ALL RELATIVE TO THE IMPACT THIS MIGHT HAVE ON GAMING, ON INDIAN LANDS? IS THAT A CONCERN OF THIS COURT AT ALL?

NO, YOUR HONOR. OTHER THAN AS INDIVIDUALS WHO MAY BE A MEMBER OF THE ELECTORATE AND PROCEED TO DECIDE WHETHER, AS A MEMBER OF THE ELECTORATE, THIS IS WEISS OR NOT WEISS TO ADOPT, BUT THERE ARE A LOT OF CONSIDERATIONS THAT IS BEING PROPOSED BY THE PROPONENTS BECAUSE THEY BELIEVE THAT ILLEGAL INDIAN GAMING AND CRUISES TO NOWHERE ALREADY DOES EXACTLY WHAT IS REQUESTED BY THIS PETITION. THAT IS THEY HAVE SLOT MACHINES AND EVERYTHING ELSE. IT IS ILLEGAL. THE STATE CAN'T STOP IT. IT IS GOING ON. IT IS EATING UP THE EXISTING LICENSED PARI-MUTUELS. THAT IS THEIR POSITION. BUT THAT IS A POLICY POSITION.

BUT SHOULD THE PUBLIC BE -- DO YOU THINK THE PUBLIC RECOGNIZES THIS IMPACT AND SHOULD THE PUBLIC BE TOLD THAT THIS COULD BE AN INCIDENTAL TO THE --

YOUR HONOR, IF YOU READ "NO CASINOS BRIEF" ALL BY ITSELF AND TAKE IT JUST BY ITSELF, THERE IS NO WAY OF TELLING THE PUBLIC WHAT THE CONSEQUENCES WILL BE. FIRST PLACE, IT IS NOT A FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, AS JUSTICE LEWIS AND OTHERS HAVE SPOKEN. IT IS A FEDERAL STATUTE. IT COULD BE CHANGED TOMORROW. IT COULD BE REVERSED TOMORROW, BY THE CONGOF THE UNITED STATES. -- BY THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES. THERE IS NO DEFINITIVE DECISION BY THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT. AS "NO CASINOS" HAS POINTED OUT, THERE IS A SPLIT BETWEEN THE FIRST AND THE NINTH CIRCUIT ON SOME OF ITS APPLICATION. THE ATTORNEY GENERAL DID NOT EVEN INCLUDE THE REFERENCE TO IT BECAUSE, BASED ON THE PRIOR DECISIONS BY THIS COURT, THIS COURT HAS DETERMINED IT TO BE IRRELEVANT, SPECIFICALLY, JUSTICE SHAH, IN 1995, THESE PEOPLE, NO CASINOS RAISED IT, THIS COURT ADDRESSED IT AND SAID IT IS NOT PART OF THE PICTURE, AND THAT IS WHAT THIS PETITION WAS DRAFTED ON.

BUT PERHAPS I DIDN'T PHRASE MY QUESTION PROPERLY. IF THE AVERAGE PERSON LOOKED AT THE TITLE OF THE SUMMARY, WOULD THEY HAVE ANY IDEA THAT THIS HAS AN IMPACT UPON GAMBLING ON INDIAN LANDS, AND SHOULD THE PUBLIC KNOW THIS, THAT OBLIGATION ON THE PROPONENTS TO POINT THIS OUT IN THE LEGISLATURE?

YOUR HONOR, I SUBMIT IT WOULD BE AS INAPPROPRIATE FOR US TO GUESS AT THE AMOUNT OF REVENUES THAT WOULD BE RAISED BY THIS AND TO TELL THE ELECTORATE HOW MUCH AND WHERE THAT COULD GO FORTH AND WHAT IT COULD DO. THOSE ARE POLICY DECISIONS FOR ARGUMENT, IN THE POLITICAL SECTOR, AND THAT IS WHAT THIS COURT HAS SAID BEFORE REPEATEDLY AND THE REASON IS WE DON'T KNOW. APPARENTLY THEY THINK THEY KNOW, BUT ALL WE KNOW IS THE EXISTENCE OF ILLEGAL, TODAY, INDIAN GAMING WHICH THEY QUOTE. THERE IS A DECISION OUT OF THE SECOND COURT THAT SAYS A HALF A BILLION DOLLARS IS BEING RAISED, TODAY, ON INDIAN LOCATIONS FROM SLOT MACHINES AND OTHER FORMS OF COLLATIII GAMBLING.

ONE MORE QUESTION. ISN'T THIS TYPICAL LOG-ROLLING, WHERE YOU HAVE TO ACCEPT THE INCOME FROM THIS IS TO GO EDUCATION, THE ELDERLY, AND SO FORTH? DON'T YOU HAVE TO TAKE ONE TO GET THE OTHER, AND ISN'T THAT THE DEFINITION OF LOG-ROLLING?

YOUR HONOR, THIS COURT HAS DEFINED LOG-ROLLING, AND THIS COURT HAS DEFINED IT OTHERWISE. THAT ARGUMENT WAS MADE IN "FLORIDIANS AGAINST" BACK IN '78. IT WAS RAISED IN THE LOTTERY CASE IN 1976. IT WAS RAISED IN LIMITED CASINOS IN 1994. IT WAS RAISED IN THE FLORIDA JUSTICE SYSTEM, WHERE THERE WASRAPHY NEW JUSTIFICATION AND THEN A REVENUE SOURCE, AND THEN IT SAID WHERE IT WENT. IT HAS BEEN RAISED AGAIN AND AGAIN AND AGAIN, AND THIS COURT HAS REJECTED IT AS BEING LOG ROLLING. THAT IS THE LAW OF THIS COURT, ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THESE PETITIONS, THIS PETITION NECESSARILY WAS WRITTEN.

MR. THOMSON, COULD I ASK ONE QUESTION, CHIEF, A FOLLOW-UP WITH THAT? MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: ALL RIGHT.

WITH REGARD TO THE WORD "EXISTING", AND IT IS A LITTLE DIFFERENT TO FOCUS THAN YOU HAVE JUST BEEN DISCUSSING ABOUT THE INDIAN GAMBLING, BUT THE SUMMARY CONTAINS THE WORD "EXISTING" AND THE AMENDMENT DOES NOT, AND LOOKING AT THE CERTIFICATION STATUTE, CERTAINLY YOU HAVE TO HAVE THOROUGHBRED RACING AND THINGS LIKE THAT, BUT FOR GREYHOUND LICENSES AND PERMITS, IT DOESN'T SEEM TO USE THE WORD "FACILITIES", AND SO MY QUESTION IS DOES THIS AMENDMENT, AND DOES THE SUMMARY REALLY CENTER IN ON AND LIMIT THESE ACTIVITIES TO EXISTING, QUOTE, FACILITIES? BECAUSE THAT WORD DOESN'T SEEM TO BE USED IN ALL OF THE LICENSING STATUTES, OR IS THAT SOMETHING THAT YOU REALLY ADDRESSED?

NO.

BECAUSE THE CONCERN ABOUT YOU HAVE AN EXISTING GREYHOUND FACILITY TODAY AT ONE LOCATION. TOMORROW THERE IS A RELOCATION.

NO, YOUR HONOR. FOLLOWING THE WORD "EXISTING", IT SAYS EXISTING PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES, WHICH IS WHAT IS THE CASE HERE TODAY, AND THEN IT SAYS IT REQUIRES THE LEGISLATURE TO LICENSE, REGULATE AND TAX SLOT MACHINES. THE LEGISLATURE HAS BROAD LICENSING POWER, SO THAT IT IS THE EXISTING COMPLEX, TODAY. THAT IS ALL YOU CAN TALK ABOUT IS THE EXISTING COMPLEX OF THE PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES. YES, YOUR HONOR. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: OKAY. I THINK IF --

THERE ARE LIMITATIONS, THEN, ABOUT HOW LONG -- HOW MANY SESSIONS THEY HAVE TO GO THROUGH AND ALL OF THE OTHER. IT IS DIRECTED AT EXISTENCE AND THE CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES MIGHT NOT EXIST, WITHIN THE MEANING -- MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: MR. THOMSON, YOU ARE INTO MR. ANTONACCI'S --

I DO NOT MEAN TO BE. THANK YOU VERY MUCH, YOUR HONOR. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: MR. HERRON. PLEASE KEEP TRACK OF YOUR TIME, SO THAT YOU CAN --

YES, SIR. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE AND MEMBERS OF THE COURT, MY NAME IS MARK HERRON. WITH ME, TODAY, IS TIMOTHY McLENDON. WE HAVE ATTEMPTED TO ALLOCATE OUR ISSUES. I AM GOING TO TRY TO DEAL WITH THE MULTIPLE SUBJECT ISSUES. MR. McLENDON IS GOING TO DEAL WITH THE BALLOT, TITLE AND SUMMARY ISSUES. AS THE ATTORNEY GENERAL REPRESENTATIVE MENTIONED, IN HIS PRESENTATION TO THE COURT, PROBABLY THE KEY ISSUE HERE, BEFORE THE COURT, THAT YOU HAVE NOT ADDRESSED OR HAD THE EFFORT TO ADDRESS BEFORE, IS THE ISSUE OF THIS AMENDMENT CREATES TWO SEPARATE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS. IT CREATES THE AMENDMENT AUTHORIZING SLOT MACHINE AND MATERIAL RELATED TO THAT, AND IT ALSO, AMENDS ARTICLE II SECTION 7 OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION. NOW, IN RESPONSE TO JUSTICE QUINCE'S QUESTION ABOUT THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE II SECTION 7, THERE IS A DEFINITION, WITHIN THAT SECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH DEFINES THE PHRASE "NEW STATE TAX OR FEE". WE BELIEVE THAT THAT IS CONTROLLING;K AND ON THIS ISSUE OF WHETHER THERE IS TWO SUBJECTS. THE PHRASE "NEW STATE TAX OR FEE" SHALL MEAN ANY TAX OR FEE WHICH WOULD PRODUCE REVENUE, SUBJECT TO LUMP SUM OR OTHER APPROPRIATION BY THE LEGISLATURE EITHER FOR THE STATE GENERAL REVENUE FUND OR ANY TRUST FUND, WHICH TAX OR FEE IS NOT IN EFFECT ON NOVEMBER 7, 1994, INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, SUCH TAXES AND FEES AS ARE SUBJECT TO THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS APPEARING ON THE BALLOT ON NOVEMBER 8, 1994. IT IS CLEAR THAT THE TAX AND FEE THAT IS BE BEING MANDATED BY -- THAT IS BEING MAN DADE BY THIS CONSTITUTIONAL FEE, THE TAX ON SLOT MACHINES, WERE NOT IN EXISTENCE ON NOVEMBER 7, 1994.

HOW IS THIS ANY DIFFERENT, THOUGH, THAN THE 1995 CASE, WHICH SIMILARLY REQUIRED OR AUTHORIZED THE TAXATION OF THE REVENUES FROM THE CASINO? ISN'T THIS, REALLY, JUST -- I MEAN, IF THIS WASN'T IN THE AMENDMENT ALL TOGETHER, THE LEGISLATURE WOULD TAX, HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO TAX THIS REVENUE FROM THE SLOT MACHINES, SO WHAT IS -- WHAT IS YOUR RESPONSE?

THE DIFFERENCE IS THAT ARTICLE II SECTION 7 WAS ADOPTED AND INSERTED IN THE CONSTITUTION IN 1996.

SO THAT --

THIS WAS NOT AN ISSUE IN THE 1995. -- IN THE 1995 CASE.

SO THIS HAS NOT BEEN ADDRESSED SINCE THEN. WHAT ABOUT THE ARGUMENT, THOUGH, THAT DIDN'T COUP AS AN ISSUE, SAY THE HIGH-SPEED RAIL CASE THAT, IS GOING TO GENERATE REVENUE. ZOO SHOULD THAT HAVE BEEN PART OF THE BALLOT SUMMARY?

MY RECOLLECTION OF THE HIGH-SPEED RAIL AMENDMENT IS DID T DID NOT DIRECT THE LEGISLATURE TO IMPOSE ANY TAX. WHAT THE PROPONENTS OF THE AMENDMENT ARE ARGUING HERE IS THE EXCEPTION, IF THEY PUT THE MAGIC WORDS IN A PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, THAT SAYS THE LEGISLATURE SHALL DO THIS, THAT SWALLOWS UP THE RULE, AND WHAT WE ARE DOING BY THAT IS WRITING OUT OF THE CONSTITUTION, THIS REQUIREMENT, AS LONG AS WE SAY THE LEGISLATURE SHALL DO THIS.

I GUESS THAT WE SAY THAT THE CHIEF PURPOSE OF THIS AMENDMENT IS TO ALLOW SLOT MACHINES TO BE IN PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES. THE INCIDENTAL EFFECT AND A VERY POSITIVE EFFECT WOULD BE THE GENERATION OF TAX REVENUE, REVENUE ON WHICH THE TAXES CAN BE IMPOSED, SO WOULD THEY HAVE BEEN ABLE TO HAVE PUT THIS AMENDMENT ON THE BALLOT, WITHOUT EVEN MENTIONING THE TAXATION PART, AND DO THE SAME EXACT THING?

I BELIEVE THAT THEY DON'T NEED TO PUT THE TAXATION LANGUAGE IN THERE. WHAT IT IS DOING IS, I THINK, IN ALL FAIRNESS TO THE PROPONENTS OF AMENDMENT, IS HIGHLIGHTING THIS ISSUE. THE OPPONENTS WOULD BE HERE WITH THE SAME ARGUMENT, HAD THEY NOT PUT IN THIS EXCEPTION FROM ARTICLE II SECTION 7. THE LEGISLATURE TODAY HAS PLENARY POWER OVER SLOT MACHINES. THEY HAVE THE POWER TODAY TO REGULATE. THEY HAVE THE POWER TO TAX. THEY HAVE THE POWER TO AUTHORIZE. A SLOT MACHINE IS NOT A LOTTERY. MR. CHIEF JUSTICE: HAVE WE SPOKEN ON THE APPARENT INCONSISTENCY BETWEEN ARTICLE XI SECTION 5-C, AND ARTICLE XI SECTION 7, AS TO THE FACT THAT THERE IS A PROVISION IN ARTICLE V, WHICH SAYS THAT YOU CAN AMEND THE CONSTITUTION BY MAJORITY VOTE OF THE PEOPLE, AND YET THERE IS THIS TWO-THIRDS PROVISION, IN SECTION VII, AND SEEM -- IN SECTION 7, AND SEEMINGLY YOU HAVE AN INCONSISTENCY, IF THE MAJORITY OF THE PEOPLE DECIDE TO EXCEPT OUT SOMETHING FROM SECTION 7?

I DON'T BELIEVE THIS COURT HAS SPOKEN TO THAT ISSUE, YOUR HONOR, BUT I BELIEVE THAT, IN TERMS OF TRADITIONAL PROVISIONS OF READING CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION THAT IS MIGHT DIFFER OR CONFLICT WITH EACH OTHER, THE PROVISIONS OF ARTICLE XI SECTION 7 CARVE OUT A SPECIAL TYPE OF INITIATIVE, TWO-THIRDS --

DOESN'T IT GO AGAINST THE GRAIN OF HOW WE ARE DEALING WITH APPROVAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS IN THIS STATE, TO SAY THAT THERE IS SOMETHING IN THE CONSTITUTION THAT CANNOT BE AMENDED BY A MAJORITY OF THE VOTERS WHO VOTE ON THAT INITIATIVE AT THE TIME? I MEAN THEN WE WOULD SET UP SOMETHING THAT IS SACROSANCT, WHICH IS THAT THE INTENT OF OUR INITIATIVE PETITION?

I BELIEVE THAT IS THE INTENT OF THE SPONSORS OF ARTICLE XI SECTION 7. I AGREE WITH YOUR HONOR THAT IT KIND OF GOES AGAINST THE GRAIN OF THE FACT THAT THE PEOPLE RETAIN ULTIMATE AUTHORITY AND POWER TO AMEND THEIR CONSTITUTION. I THINK THE PEOPLE COULD REPEAL OR DELETE ARTICLE XI SECTION 7 BY A MAJORITY VOTE.

THEN IF THE PEOPLE CAN DO THAT, WHY CAN'T THEY EXCEPT THINGS OUT?

WELL, THE REASON IS THIS COURT HAS SPOKEN ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER YOU CAN AMEND TO THE CONSTITUTION, ANOTHER PROVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION, BY VIOLATING THE SINGLE-SUBJECT RULE, WITH RESPECT TO SOME OTHER ISSUE, AND YOU HAVE SPOKEN TO THAT IN A NUMBER OF CASES.

BUT THAT IS A DIFFERENT PROBLEM.

WELL, I THINK, AGAIN, YOUR HONOR, I DON'T THINK IT IS, BECAUSE, AGAIN, IF THE PEOPLE AND THE PROPONENTS WANTED TO CHANGE THIS RULE, THEY WOULD COME FORTH WITH AN AMENDMENT TO CHANGE THIS RULE IN ARTICLE XI SECTION 7, JUST LIKE THEY DID WITH THE TAX LIMITATION AMENDMENTS. THE AMENDMENTS WERE PREPARED BEFORE THIS COURT. THE COURT SAID YOU COULDN'T DO TWO THING INS ONE AMENDMENT. THE PROPONENTS CAME BACK TWO YEARS LATER AND AMENDED AND SAID WE CAN DEAL WITH BUDGET AND TAX-SPENDING ISSUES IN THE SAME AMENDMENT.

IF THERE WAS AN INITIATIVE WHICH SAID THAT THERE SHALL BE A SALES TAX ON SERVICES, AND THAT THIS SHALL NOT COME WITHIN SECTIONS, THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 7 OF ARTICLE XI, COULD THE PEOPLE DO THAT, BY MAJORITY VOTE?

I BELIEVE THEY CANNOT, BASED ON ARTICLE XI, SECTION 7. I BELIEVE MY TIME HAS EXPIRED, YOUR HONOR.

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. I REPRESENT "NO CASINOS" AND OTHER ORGANIZATIONS AND SOCIETIES OF THIS STATE WHICH OPPOSE THE PROVISION. I WOULD LIKE TO ADDRESS JUST ONE OTHER SINGLE-SUBJECT ISSUE RAISED BY THIS. EVANS, EVERGLADES BOTH MAKE CLEAR, THOUGH, THAT PERFORMANCE, BY INITIATIVE, OF FUNCTIONS FROM MUP MUL TIP HE WILL BRANCH -- FROM MULTIPLE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT IS CLEARLY A SINGLE-SUBJECT VIOLATION, AND I THINK CLEARLY WHEN WE ARE LOOK ING AT THE SLOT MACHINE INITIATIVE, WHAT WE FIND IS AN INITIATIVE THAT GOES FAR BEYOND THE TWO INITIATIVES OF THIS COURT, THE TWO CASINO INITIATIVES THIS COURT APPROVED IN 1994 AND '95. THOSE INITIATIVES WERE CONTENT TO REQUIRE SOME LEVEL OF LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION. THIS GROUP OF SPONSORS WAS NOT CONTENT WITH THAT. AND THEY WENT FURTHER. THEY WANTED TO DIRECT THE LEGISLATURE, IN ITS IMPLEMENTATION, SO THAT IT COULD DO CERTAIN FAVORED THINGS, NAMELY THE APPROPRIATION OF TAX REVENUES TO THE FAVORED PURPOSES OF EDUCATION PROGRAMS AND SENIOR CITIZEN PROGRAMS, AND IT IS THERE THAT I THINK THEY HAVE OVERREACHED THEMSELVES, AND THEY ARE PERFORMING OTHER FUNCTIONS. THEY ARE COMMANDING A TAX BY THE LEGISLATURE, NOT JUST PROVIDING FOR LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION.

WAS IT "FLORIDIANS AGAINST CASINO TAKE OVER", WASN'T THAT DIRECTED TO LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EDUCATION?

IT ISc TRUE, YOUR HONOR, BACK IN 1978, THIS COURT DID APPROVE AN AMENDMENT DIRECTED TO TAX REVENUE AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AND EDUCATION. I WOULD SUBMIT THAT WE ARE NO LONGER IN THE WORLD OF CASINOS TAKE OVER AND WAIVER. I WOULD SUBMIT THAT WE NOW REQUIRE STRICT COMPLIANCE. THAT IS SINCE THE ADVISORY PROCESS WAS INTRODUCED. IT REQUIRES STRICT COMPLIANCE WITH THE SINGLE-SUBJECT AMENDMENT, AND THAT THIS COURT HAS, IN THE PAST, NOTABLY IN THE "SAVE OUR EVERGLADES" INITIATIVE WHICH PROPOSED A TAX WHICH DIRECTED APPROPRIATIONS TO CERTAIN FUNCTIONS. THIS I THINK, RAISES INTERESTING COLLATERAL, REGARDING THE GOVERNOR. DOES IT AFFECT THE GOVERNOR'S VETO POWER? I THINK FURTHERMORE, BECAUSE THEY WANTED TO INTRODUCE THE TAX ISSUE, BECAUSE THEY, THEN, WANTED TO INTRODUCE THE SPECIAL APPROPRIATIONS ISSUE FOR THIS REASON, THEY FIND THEMSELVES CAUGHT BY ARTICLE XI SECTION 7. THEY PROBABLY WOULDN'T HAVE AND MIGHT NOT HAVE BEEN, IF THEY WOULD HAVE CONTENTED THEMSELVES WITH THE LIMITED CASINOS APPROACH, WHICH MERELY ALLOWED FOR LEGISLATIVE IMPLEMENTATION, BUT BY MEETING THE LEGISLATURE, ITSELF, THEIR AGENTS AND COMMANDING TAXES, SO THEY COULD DIRECT THE REVENUES, THEY BRING THEMSELVES SQUARELY WITHIN ARTICLE XI SECTION 7.

WHAT ABOUT THIS BUSINESS ABOUT THE TRAIN AMENDMENT LAST, THAT WE APPROVED TO GO ON THE BALLOT, WHERE CLEARLY THE LEGISLATURE WAS MANDATED TO ACT.

IT WAS MANDATED TO ACT.

AND IT WAS STATED THERE THAT THIS WAS TO BE FOR THIS COMMUTER RAIL.

I THINK I WOULD AGREE WITH MR. HERRON, THAT IN THIS CASE, IT REQUIRES A THING, AND THE THING IS GOING TO COST MONEY, AND THE MONEY WILL COME FROM SOMEWHERE, BUT IT DOES NOT MAKE -- IT DOES NOT COMMAND THE LEGISLATURE TO TAX, AND I WOULD SEE, IN THAT HAD, A DISTINCTION -- IN THAT, A DISTINCTION.

BUT THAT IS HARDLY A REAL DISTINCTION, BECAUSE IF YOU ARE GOING TO BUILD A RAILROAD, THERE IS GOING TO HAVE TO BE A TAX.

I WOULD AGREE WITH WHAT YOU ARE SAYING THAT, YES, THERE MAY WELL BE A TAX, BUT IN THIS CASE, IF WE ALLOW THIS EXCEPTION, THEN NO FUTURE TAX WOULD BE IN THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE XI SECTION 7, BECAUSE ANY FUTURE INITIATIVE WILL SIMPLY MAKE THE LEGISLATURE ITS AGENT, COMMAND TAXATION AND HOLD ITSELF IMMUNE FROM ARTICLE VII.

ISN'T THE INTENT OF THAT ARTICLE, THOUGH, TO LIMIT THE PROMULGATION OF NEW TAXES AND SUCH AS JUSTICE WELLS SAID, A SERVICES TAX, AS OPPOSED TO SAYING THERE IS GOING TO BE REVENUES FROM A PARTICULAR INITIATIVE, AND THOSE ARE GOING TO BE TAXED, IS THAT REALLY WHAT THE CITIZENS WERE CONCERNED ABOUT, WHEN THEY INITIATED ARTICLE XI SECTION 7?

THAT MAY WELL HAVE BEEN ON MANY OF THEIR MINDS, AND CERTAIN TYPES OF TAX WERE CLEARLY ON THEIR MINDS, BUT ON ITS FACE IT DEALS WITH NEW TAXES, AN AMENDMENT WHICH WAS IMPOSEED BECAUSE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT, AND ACTUALLY I THINK IN THIS CASE, THIS INITIATIVE GOES MUCH FURTHER, BECAUSE THEY PERFORM A CLASSICALLY-JUDICIAL FUNCTION, WHEN THEY LOOK AT THEIR OWN CASE AND MAKE A RULE APPLICABLE NOT TO A SPECIFIC CLASS OF INDIVIDUALS, LIKE THE REVENUE LIMITS CASE IN 1994, BUT TO ONE CASE ONLY, AN EXEMPTION FROM THE SCOPE OF ARTICLE I 1 SECTION 7.

WOULD YOU MOVE TO THE QUESTION THAT JUSTICE SHAW ASKED YOUR OPPONENT, IN RESPECT TO THE INDIAN GAMING, AND JUST HOW FAR DO THESE SUMMARIES HAVE TO GO, IN ORDER TO WARN OF OTHER CONSEQUENCES, ESPECIALLY IN THE LIMITATIONS WITHIN THE WORDS THAT WE HAVE SET FORTH?

THERE ARE LIMITATIONS, AND OBVIOUSLY THE 75-WORD LIMIT IS A REAL LIMIT, AND IT POSES AN ISSUE FOR DRAFTERS. I THINK THE ISSUE, UNDER ASKEW AND OTHER BALLOT SUMMARY TITLES IS TRUTHFULNESS. DOES A SUMMARY TELL THE TRUTH ABOUT WHAT THIS INITIATIVE WILL DO? AND IN THIS CASE, WE KNOW, BECAUSE OF FEDERAL LAW, THIS INITIATIVE WILL LEGALIZE INDIAN GAMING, CLASS III GAMING, NOT NECESSARILY ONLY SLOT MACHINES BUT OTHER TYPES OF CLASS III GAMING POTENTIALLY, AND WHAT THE SUMMARY DOES, AND THE REASON IT IS SO MISLEADING, IS THE REPEATED USE OF THE WORD, THE REASSURING WORD "ONLY" PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES, IN THE COUNTYIES THAT APPROVE THEM ONLY AND WE KNOW, HOWEVER, FROM THE OPERATION OF FEDERAL LAW, THIS IS NOT THE CASE. THE VOTERS WILL BE MISLED. POWER WILL PASS FROM THEIR STATE OFFICIALS, AND THE VOTERS WILL NOT HAVE KNOWN THAT THEY WERE GIVING IT AWAY.

DO YOU AGREE, I BELIEVE THE PROPONENTS OF THIS AMENDMENT STATED EARLIER, THAT THESE VIDEO MACHINES THAT ALREADY EXIST ON SOME OF THESE INDIAN RESERVATIONS ARE, ALSO, SLOT MACHINES, OR A TYPE OF SLOT MACHINE?

I WOULD PROBABLY AGREE THAT, YES, THEY WOULD SEEM TO BE A SLOT MACHINE.

SO WOULDN'T THAT, THEN, FOLLOW THAT WE ALREADY HAVE CLASS III GAMING ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS, SO WHY WOULD YOU NEED TO NOW POINT IT OUT, IF IT ALREADY EXISTS?

THAT WE MAY HAVE SOMETHING GOING ON SURREPTITIOUSLY AND ILLEGALLY, I WOULD SAY, IS VERY LIKELY, CERTAINLY THE 1999 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT CASE SAYS THAT. THE PROBLEM IS HERE WE ARE LEGALIZING IT. THEY SAY THAT. WE NEED TO LEVEL THE PLAYING FIELD, BUT WE ARE NOT TELLING THE VOTERS THAT WE ARE DOING THAT, AND IT IS NONDISCLOSURE OF ONE OF THE EFFECTS OF THIS INITIATIVE, THE LEGAL EFFECTS, IS THE WORD THAT EVANS USES. IT IS A LEGAL EFFECT, AND THEY WANT TO REMOVE THIS COURT FROM ANY EXAMINATION OF LEGAL EFFECTS THAT DO NOT FIND THEMSELVES IN THE SCOPE OF THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION. NO CASINOS WOULD ARGUE THAT THIS IS SOMETHING THIS COURT CAN AND SHOULD CONSIDER, AND IT IS DIFFERENT FROM THE WAY WE RAISED IT IN 1994. THIS COURT, IT WAS RAISED IN THE BACK OF A BRIEF IN '94, AND THIS COURT SAID THAT IT IS A SPECULATIVE THING. THE LAW HAS CHANGED, HAS DEVELOPED SINCE THEN. THE IMPACTS OF THIS AMENDMENT ARE FAR MORE KNOWN AND FAR MORE CERTAIN THAN THEY WERE IN 1994.

WAS IT 100 PERCENT FACT THAT IT WILL LEGALIZE CLASS III GAMING ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS, OR IS THAT SUBJECT TO INTERPRETATION? THE PROBLEM, AS MR. THOMPSON POINTS OUT, IS CONFLICTING DECISIONS? THERE IS NO QUESTION IT IS A LEGAL EFFECT. OR ARE YOU SAYING THAT THEY SHOULD SAY, WELL, THIS MIGHT HAVE AN EFFECT ON THESE ISSUES?

WE WOULD ARGUE THERE IS NO DOUBT THIS WILL LEGALIZE CLASS III GAMBLING. THE ONE NINTH CIRCUIT CASE THAT HE WAS TALKING ABOUT, THE RUMSEY CASE, IS AS TO WHAT TYPES OF CLASS III GAMBLING IS PERMITTED, BUT OTHERS SAID ANY CLASS III GAMING IS PERMITTED. THESE ARE EFFECTS THAT ARE NOT DISCLOSED. I WOULD, ALSO, WANT TO POINT OUT THERE ARE OTHER SERIOUS PROBLEMS WITH THIS SUMMARY BALLOT AND TITLE. THIS WHOLE USE OF THE TWO-THIRDS VOTE REQUIREMENT IS A CONFUSING THING TO THE AVERAGE VOTER. IT WILL TEND TO MISLEAD THEM, AS TO WHERE IT APPLIES. DOES IT APPLY TO THE VOTE TO APPROVE THIS AMENDMENT, OR WILL IT APPLY TO THE VOTE TO APPROVE THE SLOT MACHINES IN THEIR RESPECTIVE COUNTIES? AND SIMILARLY, THE TAX DESCRIBED IN THE SUMMARY. MR. CHIEF UP. THANK YOU VERY MUCH. MR. ANTONACCI.

MR. CHIEF JUSTICE. MEMBERS OF THE COURT. I AM PETER ANTONACCI. I REPEAT THE -- I REPRESENT THE FLORIDA HORSE MAN'S ASSOCIATION AND THE SOUTH FLORIDA GREYHOUND ASSOCIATION. I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE UP WHERE YOU LEFT OFF, JUSTICE WELLS, ON THE HYPOTHETICAL REGARDING THE SERVICES TAX. THERE IS NOTHING IN OUR CONSTITUTION, TODAY, THAT SUSPENDS THE MADGE ORTARIAN POLICY THAT IS I AM -- THE MAJORITY POLICY POLICY THE MAJORITY POLICY AND THE CONSTITUTION. THE PEOPLE WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO INSTRUCT THE LEGISLATURE, BY PETITION, TO ADOPT A SERVICES TAX AND EXEMPT THAT SERVICES TAX FROM THE AMBIT OF ARTICLE XI SECTION 7.

WOULD YOU AGREE, THOUGH THAT, SECTION 7 APPEARS TO BE IN CONFLICT WITH THAT, BECAUSE IT IS VERY DEFINITE THAT IT REQUIRES TWO-THIRDS VOTE TO INITIATE A NEW TAX THROUGH THE CONSTITUTION?

IT APPEARS TO BE A CONFLICT, YES. BUT, AGAIN, THERE -- THE LIMITED EFFECT OF ARTICLE XI SECTION 7 IS JUST A SUSPENSION FROM ARTICLE X SECTION 12, WHICH WOULD OTHERWISE REQUIRE MAJORITY RULE, AND IN THIS SITUATION, AS WE POINT OUT IN OUR PAPERS, THE COURTS HAVE PREVIOUSLY HELD, AND IT HELD IN FLORIDIANS AGAINST, IN 1978, THAT THERE WAS A ONENESS OF PURPOSE IN THE REGULATION AND TAXATION AND ADOPTION OF A CASINO AMENDMENT AT THAT POINT, AND THE DISTRIBUTION, THE COURT CALLS IT DISTRIBUTION, BUT IT IS ACTUALLY AN APPROPRIATION OR TAXATION SITUATION, AND IN THIS SITUATION WHAT WE ARE POINTING OUT IN THIS AMENDMENT, IS THAT IF YOU EXEMPT THAT TAXATION SECTION FROM THE AMBIT OF THIS AMENDMENT, THAT WHAT YOU ARE DOING IS SIMPLY SAY  SAYING, TO THE PEOPLE, THAT THIS IS A ONE-PURPOSE AMENDMENT, AND THE ONE-PURPOSE AMENDMENT, AS JUSTICE PARIENTE HAS POINTED OUT IS TO PERMIT THESE CASINOS, THE SLOT MACHINES TO OPERATE IN EXISTING PARI-MUTUEL FACILITIES, AND TO TAKE THE TWO-THIRDS REQUIREMENT OF THAT TAXATION OUT FROM UNDER THE AMENDMENT, AND WE POINT OUT IN OUR BRIEFS, THAT THE, SINCE 1978, AND ALTHOUGH I WILL POINT OUT THAT THERE HAS BEEN NO CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE INJURIES PRUDENCE IN REGARDS TO ARTICLE XI SECTION 71984 -- ARTICLE XI, SECTION 7, 1984 --

I HIM SORRY, MR. ANTONACCI -- I AM SORRY, MR. ANTONACCI, YOUR TIME IS UP.