The following is a real-time transcript taken as closed captioning during the oral argument proceedings, and as such, may contain errors. This service is provided solely for the purpose of assisting those with disabilities and should be used for no other purpose. These are not legal documents, and may not be used as legal authority. This transcript is not an official document of the Florida Supreme Court.
Roy McDonald v. State of Florida
SC05-2141
>> PLEASE RISE.
HERE YE, HERE YE, HEAR YE.
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA IS
NOW IN SESSION.
ALL WHO HAVE CAUSE TO PLEA,
DRAW NEAR, GIVE ATTENTION,
AND YOU SHALL BE HEARD.
GOD SAVE THESE UNITED STATES,
THE GREAT STATE OF FLORIDA
AND THIS HONORABLE COURT.
>> GOOD MORNING.
>> GOOD MORNING.
>> LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT.
PLEASE BE SEATED.
>> GOOD MORNING, FRIENDS,
AND WELCOME TO THE FIRST
CALENDAR FOR 2007.
THE NINETY-FIRST CASE ON THE
DOCKET -- FIRST CASE ON THE
DOCK FRT JANUARY IS ROY
McDONALD v. STATE OF
FLORIDA.
MR. KAEISER READY TO
PROCEED?
>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT
CLAYTON KAEISER FOR THE
PETITIONER ON THE CASE.
THE MAIN ISSUE IN THIS CASE
IS WHETHER OR NOT THE PRISON
RELEASE REOFFENDER STATUTE
AS INTERPRETED BY THIS COURT
IN THE CASE OF GRANT v.
STATE PROHIBITS A TRIAL
COURT FROM IMPOSING A
10-YEAR MINIMUM MANDATORY
SENTENCE CONCURRENT WITH THE
PRISONER RELEASE REOFFENDER
SENTENCE UNDER THE
10-20-LIFE STATUTE.
>> I HAVE JUST A PRACTICAL
QUESTION FROM THE POINT OF
YOUR CLIENT.
THE FOURTH DISTRICT'S
OPINION ALLOWS THE
IMPOSITION OF THE TEN-YEAR
MINIMUM MANDATORY CONCURRENT
WITH THE MINIMUM MANDATORY
LIFE.
YOU ARE ARGUING NOT TO THAT
SENTENCE WITH THE 10-YEAR
MINIMUM MANDATORY TO BE SET
ASIDE OR DO YOU WANT THE
LIFE SENTENCE TO BE SET
AHEAD.
>> I THINK WE WANT
EVERYTHING TO BE SET AICIDE.
>> RIGHT BUT I THINK IT'S A
PRACTICAL MATFER WE FOLLOWED
GRANT WOULDN'T THE 10-YEAR
MINIMUM MANDATORY BE OUT AND
YOUR CLIENT WOULD SIMPLY
HAVE A MINIMUM MANDATORY OF
LIFE?
>> YES.
>> SO I'M TRYING TO UNDER
THE SIGNIFICANCE FROM THE
POINT OF VIEW OF THE
DEFENDANT BECAUSE YOU ARE
ARGUING A LOT OF FUNDAMENTAL
FAIRNESS ISSUES HERE.
HOW IT REALLY HARMS YOUR
CLIENT.
IN TERMS OF THE SENTENCE
THAT HE RECEIVED ON THE MAIN
ISSUE THAT WE'RE HERE
BEFORE.
>> RIGHT.
IT'S -- I MEAN HE -- WHETHER
WE WIN OR LOSE, HE'S STILL
GOING TO HAVE A LIFE
SENTENCE.
IF WE WIN OR LOSE ON THAT
ISSUE.
AND I WAS THINKING ABOUT
THIS AS I WAS PREPARING THE
ARGUMENT IF I WIN MY CLIENT
STILL GETS A LIFE SENTENCE
BUT AT ANY RATE WE ARE IN
FRONT OF THE COURT AND IT IS
KIND OF I THINK AN IMPORTANT
--
>> DOES IT, WELL, TO
CONTINUE WITH THAT, DOES IT
HAVE ANY KIND OF PRACTICAL
EFFECT?
DO YOU GET TO, TO HAVE
ANYMORE GAME TIME OR
ANYTHING?
>> HE DOESN'T GET ANY GAIN
TIME UNDER THE PRISONER
RERELEASE OFFENDER STATUTE.
>> THAT'S THE CRUX OF THE
WHOLE ISSUE WHETHER OR NOT
YOU CAN BE SENTENCED TO LESS
MINIMUM MANDATORY BECAUSE
HE'S GOT THE HIGHEST MINIMUM
MANDATORY THAT HE COULD
POSSIBLY RECEIVE SO THAT WAS
A BIG PART OF MY ARGUMENT AS
FAR AS WHETHER OR NOT HE CAN
BE SENTENCED TO A LESSER
MINIMUM MANDATORY ANYWAY
BECAUSE IT REALLY AMOUNTS TO
A MEANINGLESS SENTENCE.
THAT'S A REALLY, YOU KNOW,
IF YOU WANT TO BOIL BY
ARGUMENT -- MY ARGUMENT DOWN
TO ONE SENTENCE THAT WOULD
BE IT.
IMPOSE AGLESSER MINIMUM
MANDATORY IS MEANINGLESS.
HE ALREADY HAS THE HIGHEST
--
>> WHAT'S THE HARM.
YOU SAY IT'S MEANINGLESS BUT
WHAT'S THE HARM?
BASICALLY MOST TIMES WHEN
PEOPLE COME AND ARGUE ABOUT
REDUCTION IN SENTENCE OR
THIS IS AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE,
IT'S BECAUSE THEY ARE GOING
TO END UP SERVING MORE TIME.
BUT HERE, WHAT IS THE REAL
HARM?
>> WELL, AS FAR AS THE
SENTENCE GOES, IT -- AND ITS
IMPACT ON MY CLIENT, IT'S
PROBABLY NOT MUCH.
THE HARM I GUESS WOULD BE
JUST KIND OF CLUTTERING UP
SENTENCING HEARINGS AND
CLUTTERING UP A-- APPELLATE
RAILROADS WITH MORE AND MORE
MINIMUM MANDATORIES.
I THINK WITH THIS COURT IN
GRANT AS I UNDERSTAND THE
COURT'S OPINION IN GRANT
THERE'S ANOTHER CASE I
BELIEVE COTTON v. STATE.
YOU KNOW, REVIEWING THIS
STATUTE THE PRISON RERELEASE
REOFFENDER STATUTE, THE
COURT FOUND IT, QUOTE WHEN
THE ACT IS PROPERLY VIEWED
AS A MINIMUM MANDATORY
STATUTE, ITS EFFECT IS TO
ESTABLISH A SENTENCING FLOOR,
AND I THINK THAT'S WHAT THE,
THE PRISON RELEASE
REOFFENDER STATUTE IS.
IT SETS THE FLOOR FOR
SENTENCE ANDING TO SENTENCE
TO SOMEBODY LESS DOESN'T
MAKE ANY SENSE.
I MEAN, HE'S ALREADY
RECEIVED THE MOST HE COULD
POSSIBLY GET.
THE STATUTORY MAXIMUM WITH
NO GAIN TIME ALLOWED, AND A
COURT --
>> SO YOUR ARGUMENT REALLY
IS THAT ANYTIME YOU GET A
PRISONER RELEASEE REOFFENDER
SENTENCE THAT YOU CANNOT
IMPOSE ANY OTHER TYPE OF
SENT SKPPBS NOT A HABITUAL
OFFENDER WHICH WAS DEALT
WITH IN THE OTHER CASE OR
THE 10-20-LIFE.
>> WELL YOU COULD RECEIVE IT
AS LONG AS ITS GREATER THAN,
YOU KNOW, AS I WAS JUST
ARGUING THE PRISONER RELEASE
REOFFENDER SENTENCE SETS THE
FLOOR.
FOR INSTANCE, THE EXAMPLE I
WOULD COME UP WITH WOULD BE
AN AGGRAVATED BATTERY CASE
WHERE SOMEBODY QUALIFIES AS
A PRISONER RELEASE
REOFFENDER AND IS ALSO FOUND
TO HAVE CAUSED GREAT BODILY
ARM USE AGFOR EXAMPLE.
IN THAT SIMP WITH -- FIRE
ARM.
IN THAT CASE IT WOULD BE
MAXIMUM 15 YEARS BUT UNDER
10-20-LIFE HE WOULD BE
LOOKING AT 25 YEARS UP TO
LIFE.
SO IN THAT CASE, THE PROPER
WANT TO SENTENCE WOULD BE TO
SENTENCE THE PERSON TO 25
YEARS MINIMUM MANDATORY
UNDER THE 10-20-LIFE BECAUSE
THE PRISON RELEASE
REOFFENDER WOULD SET THE
FLOOR BUT SINCE THE OTHER
10-20-LIFE STATUTE ALLOWS
FOR A HIGHER SENTENCE, THAT
WOULD BE THE PROPER SENTENCE
UNDER THIS COURT'S PRIOR
RULING IN GRANT AND YOU KNOW
UNDER THE STATUTE ITSELF.
THE PRISON RELEASE
REOFFENDER STATUTE ITSELF
SAYS ANOTHER STATUTE ALLOWS
FOR A GREATER SENTENCE,
THAT'S THE STATUTE THAT
SHOULD BE USED TO SENT THNS
DEFENDANT.
>> BUT AT ANY RATE THE, THE
PRISON RELEASE REOFFENDER
STATUTE IS THE, IT
ESTABLISHES A TRUE MINIMUM
MANDATORY SENTANTS BECAUSE
IT, THE STATUTE ITSELF TAKES
AWAY ALL OF THE TRIAL
COURT'S DISCRETION, THE
STATUTE READS THE COURT MUST
SENTENCE AS FOLLOWS: AND
WHEN I REFUSED ALL THESE
SENTENCISHIN' STATUTES,
THERE WAS ONLY ONE OTHER
STATUTE THAT I FOUND THAT
HAD+++GBcNO CARRIERRINGCONNECT 115200ATORY READ IT IN LIGHT
OF THIS COURT'S OWN PRIOR
RULINGS, AND SPECIFICALLY,
THE CASE OF PALMER v. STATE,
WHICH ESTABLISHES THE SINGLE
TRANSACTION RULE WHICH HOLDS
THAT, YOU KNOW, THE MINIMUM
MANDATORIES MUST BE
CONCURRENT AS LONG AS
THEY'RE ALL INCURRED IN THE
SAME TRANSACTION, AND WHAT
-- MY ARGUMENT IS IS THAT
INTERPRETING THE 10-20-LIFE
STATUTE, THIS COURT DIDN'T
TAKE THE LEGISLATIVE
LANGUAGE AS OVERRULING ITS
OWN PRIOR DOCTRINES, OR ITS
OWN PRIOR RULINGS AS FAR AS
THE ISSUE OF CONSECUTIVE
MINIMUM MANDATORIES GO, AND
IN THIS CASE, I, I SUBMIT
THAT IT'S THE SAME SITUATION
AS FAR AS INTERPRETING GRANT
v. STATE, WHICH IS THIS
COURT'S PRIOR RULING ON THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER OR NOT THE
PRISON RELEASE REOFFENDER
STATUTE WOULD ALLOW FOR
LESSER MINIMUM MANDATORIES
Y. MEAN THE WHOLE POINT WITH
GRANT, AND I THINK THIS
COURT WAS RIGHT IN GRANT.
THIS IS A TRUE MINIMUM
MANDATORIES STATUTE.
WHEN SOMEBODY GETS A MINIMUM
MANDATORY IN THIS CASE, LIFE
IN PRISON, IT'S JUST
MEANINGLESS TO SOME LESSER
MINIMUM MANDATORY BECAUSE
THEY'VE ALREADY RECEIVED THE
HIGHEST MINIMUM MANDATORY
POSSIBLE.
>> FROM MY UNDERSTANDING,
GRANT WAS BASED ON THE
LANGUAGE OF THAT PARTICULAR
STATUTE, NOT ON DOUBLE
JEOPARDY CONCERN.
>> THAT'S RIGHT.
>> ISN'T THERE A DIFFERENCE
HERE THAT THE LEGISLATIVE
INTENT IS PRETTY CLEAR ABOUT
WHAT THE LEGISLATURE
INTENDED TO DO IN THIS
STATUTE DIFFERENT FROM THE
STATUTE IN GRANT?
>> WELL, THE LEGISLATURE IN
ITS LANGUAGE DIDN'T SAY THAT
THEY INTENDED TO OVERRULE
GRANT OR TO OVERRULE THIS
COURT'S INTERPRETATION, AND
YOU KNOW I WAS GOING THROUGH
THESE -- THE SENTENCING
STATUTES AS I WAS PREPARING
FOR THE ARGUMENT AND THERE
WERE SEVERAL THAT WERE
REENACTED THAT WOULD
SPECIFICALLY STATE TATHAT
WHILE THIS STATUTE IS DESIGNED
TO DEAL WITH THE -- I THINK
THERE WAS ONE THAT WHERE
THERE WAS A SINGLE SUBJECT
ON A CASE FROM ONE OF THE
LOWER APPELLATE COURTS THAT
HAD FOUND ONE OF THE
SENTENCING STATUTES VIOLATED
THE SINGLE SUBJECT RULE THAT
FLORIDA CONSTITUTION, AND
WHEN THE LEDGE SLACHER
REENACTED THIS STATUTE IN
QUESTION THEY ACTUALLY PUT
THAT INTO THE LANGUAGE --
LANGUAGE, THE PREAMBLE
LANGUAGE OF THE STATUTE.
THAT DIDN'T HAPPEN IN THIS
CASE.
SO AS FAR AS THE LEGISLATIVE
INTENT GOES, I DON'T ACCEPT
THAT IT, IT CLEARLY
OVERRULES THIS COURT'S
INTERPRETATION OF PRISON
RELEASE REOFFENDER.
AND UNLESS THE COURT HAS ANY
FURTHER QUESTIONS, I'LL TURN
THE FLOOR OVER TO MY
COLLEAGUES.
>> THANK YOU.
KOURNL?
-- COUNSEL.
>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT,
MY NAME IS JOSEPH TRANGALLEY,
I REPRESENT THE STATE OF
FLORIDA, THE RESPOND IN THIS
MATTER.
JUSTICE ANSTEAD I WANT TO
APPALL JS FOR NOT STANDING
UP A MOMENT AGO FOR NO
OBJECTION.
YOU CAUGHT ME OFF GUARD.
[LAUGHTER]
>> CAN I ASK THE STATE --
>> YES.
>> SORT OF THE FLIPSIDE OF
THE QUESTION.
IT SEEMS THAT IF YOU TAKE
GRANT, WHAT WE WERE SAYING
IS UNDER THE PRISON ROENT
RELEASE -- RECENT RELEASEE
REOFFENDER, THOSE QUALIFYING
UNDER THAT STATUTE RECEIVE
THAT MAXIMUM PENALTY.
THE 10-20-LIFE WAS MEANT ON
ANOTHER SIDE SO THAT ANYONE
CARRYING A GUN TO AT LEAST
HAVE 10 YEARS, 20 YEARS,
LIFE.
WHY DOES THE STATE WANT TO
HAVE A SITUATION WHERE
SOMEONE GETS A MANDATORY
SENTENCE OF LIFE, AND THEN
ALSO THERE IS IMPOSED A
MINIMUM MANDATORY OF TEN
YEARS?
IT SEEMS THERE'S JUST NOT --
NOT THAT THAT'S CONFUSING,
THAT THAT'S A POTENTIAL FOR
SOMEONE TO ARGUE, WELL,
WE'VE GOT 10 AND WE'VE GOT
LIFE SO GIVE US THE 10 YEARS.
I DON'T -- SO EXPLAIN WHAT
THE REAL LIFE EFFECT OF THIS
CASE IS FOR THE STATE OF
FLORIDA AND FOR PRISONERS
THAT ARE SERVING SENTENCING
TIME BECAUSE OTHERWISE I
THINK THAT PEOPLE WATCHING
THIS ORAL ARGUMENT WILL BE
SCRATCHING THEIR HEADS AND
WONDERING WHAT WE ARE UP
HERE TALKING ABOUT.
>> YOUR HONOR, WE'RE NOT
ARGUING FOR ANY PARTICULAR
SENTENCE.
WE ARE ARGUING TO UPHOLD THE
DECISION OF THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL,
WHICH THE STATE CONTENDS
PROPERLY INTERPRETED THE
10-20-LIFE STATUTE.
>> I UNDERSTAND THAT,
BECAUSE IT SEEMS TO ME IF
YOU READ SUBSECTION C OF THE,
OF THE PRR STATUTE, THAT IT
WAS -- NO, OF THE 10-20-LIFE
STATUTE, IT WOULD APPEAR TO
BE THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
THAT IN ANY EVENT THAT AT
LEAST THE MINIMUM MANDATORY
OF THE 10-20-LIFE GOT
IMPOSED.
IT SEEMS IF YOU READ C THAT
IT'S A LITTLE CONFUSING
BECAUSE THEY START OUT BY
SAYING THAT IF THE MINIMUM
MANDATORY UNDER ANOTHER --
UNDER THIS STATUTE EXCEEDS
THE MINIMUM MANDATORY UNDER
ANOTHER STATUTE THAT YOU AT
LEAST MUST IMPOSE THIS
MINIMUM MANDATORY AND THEN
THEY GO ON WITH THE SECOND
SENT SKPPBS SAYS BUT IF THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED ANOTHER
SECTION IS HIGHER, YOU ALSO
NEED TO IMPOSE THIS.
>> CORRECT.
>>> I WOULD THINK IF WE WENT
BACK TO THOSE IN LEGISLATIVE
-- THEY WOULD SAY WE WANTED
THE HIGHEST OF THE SENTENCES
TO BE IMPOSED BECAUSE THAT
WOULD MAKE SENSE AND ITS
RRTS CONSISTENT WITH GRANT
THAT WE HAVE HARSHNESS IN
SENTENCING, WE WANT THE MACK
MM.
WE DON'T WANT TO HAVE
CONFUSION IN SENTANTSING.
>> I WOULD SUBMIT, YOUR
HONOR, THAT AND I NOTICED
THAT IN THE STATUTE AND THE
ONLY THING I CAN EQUATE IT
TO IS SOME PARTS OF THE OLD
TESTAMENT WHERE IT SAYS YOU
MUST DO THIS AND IN THE IN
THE NEXT PARAGRAPH YOU MUST
DO THIS AND IT SAYS
ESSENTIALLY THE SAME THING.
THE LEGISLATURE WAS
ABSOLUTELY CLEAR IN ITS
DESIRE THAT UNDER 10-20-LIFE,
THESE MEN MM SENTENCES BE
IMPOSED IN EITHER EVENT SO
--
>> BUT WHAT IT IS -- IS
THERE ANY EFFECT WITH THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
SOMEONE'S GOT A PRR SENTENCE
THAT HADS LIFE MANDATORY
LIFE SENT SKPPBS THEY DON'T
HAVE THIS 10-YEAR MINIMUM
MANDATORY IMPOSED UNDER
10-20-LIFE AND SOMEONE ELSE
HAS IT IMPOSED, ARE THEY
JUST -- FOLLOWING UP WITH
JUSTICE CONVINCE WAS ASKING
ON IT TO YOUR -- OPPONENT,
IS THERE SOMETHING WE'RE
MISSING AS TO HOW THIS WOULD
IN THE REAL WORLD AFFECT
THIS MAN'S TIME SERVED, THE
CONDITIONS OF HIS, SOMETHING
THAT WE'RE MISSING?
>> I DON'T BELIEVE SO.
I BELIEVE UNDER THE EITHER
ONE OF THESE ALIFE SENTENCE
IMPOSED IN FLORIDA UNDER THE
CURRENT LAW IS LIFE.
NOW WITHOUT GAIN TIME OR
WITHOUT ANY TIME OFF OR ANY
OF THOSE OTHER THINGS.
THERE ARE RULES WITHIN THE
DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS OF
WHICH I AM NOT SURE.
THAT MAY OR MAY NOT HAVE
SOME EFFECT.
BUT OUR, OUR POINT IN THIS
CASE FOR BEING HERE BEFORE
THIS COURT IS SIMPLY TO
UPHOLD THE DECISION OF THE
FOURTH DISTRICT COURT OF
APPEAL WITH WHAT WE CAN
CONTEND IS A PROPER
INTERPRETATION OF THE
10-20-LIFE STATUTE.
WE KEEP GETTING SIDETRACKED
BECAUSE WE KEEP GOING BACK
TO GRANT, AND GRANT TALKED
ABOUT THE INTERPLAY, AND
THAT'S THE WORD USE SAID IN
GRANT, THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN
THE PRR STATUTE AND THE
HABITUAL FELONY OFFENDER
STATUTE.
THAT'S FINE.
THAT, THAT'S A DECISION THAT
DEALS WITH THOSE TWO
STATUTES.
TODAY, WE ARE DEALING WITH A
DIFFERENT STATUTE.
WE ARE TALKING ABOUT THE
INTERPLAY BETWEEN THE PRR
STATUTE AND THE 10-20-LIFE
STATUTE.
>> YEAH, IN THIS SITUATION,
I, IS IT CONCEIVABLE THAT A
PERSON CAN BE CHARGED WITH
VARIOUS COUNTS OF A CRIME,
AND FOR ONE OF THE COUNTS
RECEIVE A LIFE SENTENCE?
AND FOR ANOTHER COUNT,
RECEIVE A PRR SENTENCE?
AND ANOTHER COUNT, RECEIVE A
10-20-LIFE SENTENCE?
YOU HAVE VARIOUS COUNTS --
>> YES, THAT COULD HAPPEN.
>> AND IN THAT INSTANCE,
WOULD IT BE CONCEIVABLE THAT,
THAT THE ONES THAT DEALT
WITH THE OTHER COUNTS, OTHER
THAN THE 10-20-LIFE WOULD BE
REVERSED ON APPEAL?
AND YOU WOULD BE LEFT WITH
THIS MINIMUM MANDATORY?
>> ABSOLUTELY, AND THAT,
THAT IS ENTIRELY POSSIBLE
DEPENDING ON THE NATURE OF
THE CHARGE, THE FACTS OF THE
CASE, AND THE VERDICT FORM.
SO THAT COULD HAPPEN.
THERE ARE ANY NUMBER OF
THINGS THAT COULD --
>> BECAUSE I'M TRYING TO
FIGURE OUT WHAT THE
LEGISLATOR'S INTENT SEEMS TO
ME --
>> I THOUGHT --
>> PERHAPS THAT'S
CONCEIVABLE.
>> I TOOK THE TIME TO LOOK
UP THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
ON THIS, AND THE ONE THING
THAT COMES THROUGH LOUD AND
CLEAR IS MINIMUM MANDATORY
SENTENCES AND FIREARMS
CASES.
AND THAT STARTS OUT RIGHT AT
THE BEGINNING AND GOES ALL
THE WAY THROUGH.
AGAIN, MY POINT TO THIS
COURT IS WE ARE TALKING NOT
ABOUT THE FACTS OF GRANT.
GRANT, IT IS TRUE, HAS
SOMETIMES BEEN APPLIED TO
THIS SITUATION WITH THE
FOURTH DISTRICT SAID IS,
GRANT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
APPLIED TO THIS SITUATION.
THIS IS A DIFFERENT STATUTE.
THE STATUTORY LANGUAGE AS
THEY SAID IN THEIR DECISION
COULD NOT HAVE BEEN MORE
CLEAR, AND THEREFORE, THEY
BASED THEIR DECISION ON
THOSE FACTS.
I WOULD ASK THIS COURT TO
AFFIRM THE FOURTH DISTRICT
COURT OF APPEAL, AND --
>> WHAT ABOUT, WHAT ABOUT
YOUR OPPONENT'S ARGUMENT
THAT REALLY WHAT WE WERE
SEEING IN GRANT IS THAT THE
PRR STATUTE REALLY IS THE
FLOOR AND THAT YOU THEN
IMPOSE ANY OTHER -- EXCUSE
ME -- SENTENCING SCHEME THAT
WOULD MAKE IT A HIGHER
SENTENCE AND NOT IMPOSE A
SENTENCING SCHEME THAT IS
LESS?
>> WELL, THAT'S FINE, BUT
THE SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF THE
SPECIFIC OF 10-20-LIFE AS
THE FOURTH DCA POINTED OUT,
EXPRESSES OVER THE LANGUAGE
GENERAL OF THE PRR STATUTE
SO WHAT WE'RE SAYING IS YES,
YOU CAN IMPOSE A PRR
SENTENCE, BUT BECAUSE OF THE
SPECIFIC LANGUAGE OF
10-20-LIFE, YOU MUST ALSO
IMPOSE THE MINIMUM SENTENCE
UNDER THE 10-20-LIFE STATUTE,
WHICH REQUIRES IT.
>> BUT THEN, OF COURSE, THE
ONLY WAY IT REALLY BECOMES
EFFECTIVE IS IF UNDER SAY
JUSTICE WELLS' SCENARIO, THE
PRR SENTENCE IS REVERSED ON
PEAL.
>> ABSOLUTELY.
THAT COULD BE ONE OF THE
WAYS, YES, BUT WE'RE, WE'RE
TALKING HERE ABOUT VERY,
VERY CLEAR STATUTORY
LANGUAGE.
WE INTERPRET THE LAWS.
PEOPLE ACROSS THE STREET
MAKE THE LAWS, AND THEY MADE
THIS ONE VERY CLEAR, AND WE
ASKED THIS COURT TO UPHOLD
THE DECISION OF THE FOURTH
DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL.
THANK YOU.
>> UNLESS THE COURT HAS ANY
FURTHER QUESTIONS, I'LL
WAIVE MY REBUTTAL.
>> THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
TAKE THE CASE UNDER
ADVISEMENT.