Larry Liner v. Workers Temporary Staffing, Inc.

SC07-1470

ALL RISE.
GOOD MORNING.
MORNING.
COURT IS BACK IN SESSION.
PLEASE BE SEATED.
THE NEXT CASE ON OUR
CALENDAR THIS MORNING IS LINER
VERSUS WORKERS TEMPORARY
STAFFING, INC.
MR.^CRABTREE, READY TO PROCEED?
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT.
THERE ARE TWO CORE PROBLEMS
WITH THE ANALYSIS IN THE TRIAL
COURT AND IN THE FOURTH DCA THE
FIRST IS THAT THEY ENGAGED IN A
MACRO ANALYSIS, --
THINK YOU NEED TO INTRODUCE
YOURSELF.
I'M JOHN CRABTREE.
WHO YOU REPRESENT AND
WE ARE RECORDING AND ON VIDEO.
IT'S ALWAYS HELPFUL IF WE HAVE
TO REVIEW THOSE THINGS TO BE
SURE WE KNOW WHO IS ON FIRST.
JUSTICE LEWIS CALLED ME BY
NAME SO I SKIPPED THAT. I APOLOGIZE.
I'M JOHN CRABTREE.
I'M HERE FOR LARRY LINER.
BEFORE YOU GET INTO THE
PROBLEMS, I'M A LITTLE CONFUSED
ABOUT THE PARAMETERS OF REVIEW
IN A CASE LIKE THIS.
THIS IS A CIVIL STATUTE THAT'S
BEEN DECLARED TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE, WHICH
DOESN'T HAPPEN VERY OFTEN.
WHAT ARE THE PARAMETERS OF
REVIEWING A CIVIL STATUTE THAT
MAY HAVE PENAL ASPECTS IT
FOR VAGUENESS?
IT IS A COMPLICATED QUESTION
GENERICALLY.
THIS CASE IT'S MADE A LITTLE
BIT LESS COMPLEX, UNLIKE MOST
STATUTES THAT WE MIGHT VIEW AS
BEING REMEDIAL, THIS ONE IS
CLEARLY BECAUSE WE HAVE A
PURPOSE, THAT IS TO FIX A PAST
WRONG.
THIS IS SORT OF REMEDIAL ON
STEORIDS --
WHAT DO YOU CALL PENAL?
IT'S REMEDIAL ON STEROIDS. WE
HAVE THE LEGISLATURE SAYING NOT
ONLY DID THEY ANNOUNCE A
PURPOSE BUT THEY ACTUALLY
CODIFY THE MANDATE THAT IT BE
CONSTRUED IN REMEDIAL FASHION.
THEY SAY IT SHALL BE
CONSTRUED --
GET REALLY TO THE BOTTOM
LINE.
THAT'S WHAT HE IS TALKING
ABOUT.
THE FOURTH DISTRICT UTILIZED A
CRIMINAL STATUTE AND, SO WE'VE
GOT, IN THAT OPINION THEY SAID,
YOU KNOW, WOULD WE ALLOW A
CRIMINAL STATUTE THAT SAYS,
POSSESSION OF DRUGS OVER A
REASONABLE AMOUNT IS PENALTY,
WOULD WE ALLOW SALE OF DRUGS
WITHIN A GEOGRAPHIC AREA OF A
CHURCH WITHOUT DEFINITION.
THAT IS WHERE THIS IS GOING.
DO WE USE THE ANALYSIS FROM
THOSE CRIMINAL STATUTES AS,
BECAUSE IT IS PENAL IN NATURE.
IT'S $1,000 PER TIME.
IF WE USE THAT ANALYSIS, THAT
IS WHERE HE IS GOING, WE ALL
NEED TO KNOW OR IS THERE SOME
DIFFERENT ANALYSIS IN A CRIMINAL
STATUTE THAT WOULD CHARGE
SOMEBODY 1,000 BUCKS EACH TIME
MAY LEAD TO ONE CONCLUSION?
IS WHERE THIS IS
GOING?
ANSWER, VERY DIRECTLY ANSWER
THIS.
I WILL TRY IT AGAIN.
448.24 LIABILITY PHASE PORTION
OF THE ACT.
448.25 IS THE PENALTY
PROVISION ARE OR PENALTY
STATUTE UNDER THE ACT.
THE PENALTY STATUTE HAS TWO
COMPONENTS.
ONE WHICH YOU GET $1,000.
ALTERNATIVELY YOU GET ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
PRACTICAL MATTER AS THE FOURTH
DCA ACKNOWLEDGED IN ALL OR
ALMOST ALL INSTANCES IT'S GOING
TO BE THE $1,000.
BUT THEY'RE ACTUALLY DIFFERENT
STATUTES.
IN THIS CASE THE PART THAT IS
BEING CHALLENGED AS TO ITS
CLARITY IS NOT THE PENALTY
PROVISION AT LEAST THE DCA.
THE DCA FOUND THE PENALTY
PROVISION WAS NOT UNDUELY
VAGUE.
THE PROBLEM IS WHETHER OR NOT THE
LIABILITY STATUTE IS UNDULY
VAGUE.
BUT IN TERMS OF INTERPRETING
IT STRICTLY, THAT WOULD BE LIKE
SAYING IN A CRIMINAL STATUTE,
WELL WE'RE ONLY TALKING ABOUT
THE CONDUCT.
WE'RE NOT -- PUNISHMENT IS IN
SEPARATE STATUTE.
THAT TO ME BEGS THE QUESTION.
WHAT HAPPENS AS A RESULT OF A
VIOLATION OF THIS STATUTE IS A
PENAL PROVISION, $1,000 A DAY.
ARE YOU SAYING THAT IT'S NOT TO
BE CONSTRUED STRICTLY IN TERMS
OF DUE PROCESS CONCERNS?
SO --
I RECOGNIZE THAT THE $1,000
PROVISION DOES TRIGGER A, IT'S
A DETERRENT AND YOU GOT TO
CONSIDER, IN DUE PROCESS
CONCERNS I AGREE YOU'VE GOT TO
DEAL WITH THAT IN ITS STRICT
APPLICATION --
AN SAY THEY SHOULD BE
CHARGING, YOU KNOW, ONLY A
DOLLAR MAYBE THERE WOULD BE
SOME ISSUE.
WE CAN, YOU KNOW, HAVE THIS,
THESE DONE IN A TRIAL AND
FIGURE OUT WHETHER IT WAS
REASONABLE BUT YOU ARE ASKING
FOR THE STATUTORY DAMAGES.
SO YOU ARE ASKING FOR THE PENAL
PROVISION FOR VIOLATIONS OF 24,
CORRECT?
YES.
WE'RE SEEKING STATUTORY DAMAGES
BUT THE STATUTORY DAMAGE, IF
THIS COURT HYPOTHETICALLY, WERE
TO STRIKE THE $1,000 PENALTY,
ON 8th AMENDMENT GROUNDS, WOULD
STILL HAVE A LIABILITY ISSUE
BECAUSE YOU WOULD STILL HAVE
THE REST OF THE STATUTE.
SO UNLIKE IN A NORMAL CRIMINAL
CONTEXT WHERE YOU'VE GOT AT
VIOLATION HERE AND PENALTY OVER
HERE, IN THIS CASE YOU'VE GOT A
VIOLATION OVER HERE AND YOU'VE
GOT TWO ALTERNATIVE PENALTY.
BUT IF YOU DID THE REVERSE,
IF THIS COURT AGREED WITH THE
FOURTH THAT THE STATUTE, THE
STATUTE, 424 WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, THEN,
WOULDN'T NECESSARILY, THE
QUESTION AS TO THE $1,000
BECOMES MOOT, CORRECT?
THAT'S ABSOLUTELY CORRECT,
JUSTICE WELLS.
THAT'S TRUE.
THE POINT I WAS TRYING TO MAKE
AT THE BEGINNING THIS IS A
SLIGHTLY UNUSUAL SITUATION
BECAUSE, WELL CERTAINLY DUE
PROCESS CONCERNS CAN TRUMP
EVERYTHING BECAUSE THE
CONSTITUTION TRUMPS STATUTES.
WE DO HAVE THE FLORIDA
LEGISLATURE HERE EXPRESSLY
MANDATING THAT THE STATUTE BE
CONSTRUED TO CARRY OUT ITS
EFFECT OF PROTECTING DAY
LABORERS.
THAT IS RIGHT AT THE BEGINNING
OF THE ACT.
IT SHALL BE CARRIED OUT.
BUT THE PROBLEM COMES IN,
WE'RE TALKING ALL AROUND IT IN
FLOWERY -- WE'VE GOT TO GET TO THE
MEAT AND BONES OF THIS.
IF YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT
SOMETHING THAT TALKS IN TERMS
OF REASONABLE AMOUNT FOR AWARD
OF ATTORNEY FEES IN CIVIL
STATUTE THAT IS NOT LIKE A
CRIMINAL STATUTE.
IT'S PROBABLY GOING TO BE UP
HEALED.
PREVAILING RATES FOR ATTORNEYS,
WE USE THESE KIND OF PHRASES.
WE USE IT IN A FAIR TRADE,
WHETHER SOMEBODY IN FOR TREBLE
DAMAGES AND ALL THESE THINGS.
WE REALLY HAVE TO GET TO THE
BOTTOM OF THE FIRST QUESTION,
HOW DO WE LOOK AT THIS?
AND GEOGRAPHIC AREA, I MEAN WE
TALK ABOUT WITH REGARD TO NO
FAULT AND GOING TO A DOCTOR.
YOU KNOW, SO YOU REALLY GOING
TO HAVE TO HIT THE HEART OF
THIS PROBLEM TO HE PREVAIL IN
THIS CASE.
I UNDERSTAND WHAT YOU'RE
SAYING BUT ACTUALLY WHAT WE
WOULD SAY, THE STATUTE ITSELF
IS CLEAR ENOUGH AND THAT, EVEN
IF IT IS STRICTLY CONSTRUED
BECAUSE OF ITS DETERRENT
COMPONENT, THE $1,000
SLEDGEHAMMER I THINK THE FOURTH
DCA SAID.
EVEN IF WE STRICTLY CONSTRUE
ITS APPLICATION AND EVEN IF WE
STRICTLY CONSTRUE IT TO DUE
PROCESS CONCERNS IT HAS TO BE
CONSTRUED TO OBVIOUS EFFECT.
IT WOULD BE TO USE HELICOPTER
AND LIMOUSINES THAT WOULD BE
ABSURD.
THAT WOULD CLEARLY NOT PROTECT
DAY LABORERS. THAT IS CLEARLY
ITS INTENT.
WHEN WE HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL
OVERTONES, DON'T WE RUN INTO
TWO CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES?
NUMBER ONE, A STATUTE SHOULD BE
INTERPRETED TO AVOID THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM.
AND NUMBER TWO, WHERE YOU ARE
IMPOSING FINES ON SOMEBODY,
IT'S A PENAL STATUTE, SHOULD BE
INTERPRETED IN LIGHT MOST
FAVORABLE TO THE DEFENDANT?
AND SO, IF THOSE ARE THE
PARAMETERS, SHOULD WE NOT
INTERPRET THE TERMS, GEOGRAPHIC
AREA, THE TERMS, REASONABLE,
OKAY, AS ENCOMPASSING IN THIS
CASE, A TRICOUNTY AREA AND IF
WE DO THAT, DO WE FIND THAT THE
STATUTE IS CONSTITUTIONAL AND
THAT THE DEFENDANT DID NOT
VIOLATE THE STATUTE IN THIS
CASE?
IF YOU CONSTRUE IT TO BE
TRICOUNTY AREA, THEN YOU CAN
CONSTRUE IT TO BE, THERE TO BE
NO VIOLATION.
YOU MIGHT CONSTRUE IT TO BE
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
YOU CANNOT HOWEVER TO CONSTRUE
TO BE TRICOUNTY AREA.
LET ME EXPLAIN WHY.
NO MATTER HOW COMPELLING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLES ARE,
NO MATTER HOW MUCH THEY REQUIRE
YOU TO STRICTLY CONSTRUE THE
STATUTE YOU CANNOT IGNORE THE
STATUTE'S PLAIN LANGUAGE.
ITS ACTUAL TEXT.
IF WE WERE HERE DRAFTING
LEGISLATION WE MIGHT DRAFT IT
RATHER DIFFERENTLY.
MIGHT DRAFT IT MORE FAVORABLE.
THIS STATUTE LOOKS AT EACH
DISCRETE EVENT.
THERE IS NO AVOIDING THAT.
THERE IS NO AMOUNT OF --.
BUT ISN'T EACH DISCRETE
EVENT, IF THE PERSON IS PICKED
UP AT THE DAY LABOR SITE AND
WHERE IS THAT SITE?
THEY'RE PICKED UP AT THE,
START AT LABOR HALL.
THEY GO TO THE LABOR HALL.
LOCATED IN WHAT COUNTY?
IN THIS INSTANCE IT'S
BROWARD COUNTY.
OKAY, BROWARD COUNTY, BUT IF
THE JOB SITE IS IN PALM BEACH
COUNTY AND WHY ISN'T THAT,
REASONABLE INTERPRETATION AND
IF THIS JOB SITE IS IN MIAMI,
THAT'S WHY I DON'T UNDERSTAND
YOUR ARGUMENT THAT IT JUST HAS
TO BE BROWARD.
IF THEY ARE TAKING THEM FROM
BROWARD TO MIAMI, OR FROM
BROWARD TO PALM BEACH, WHAT'S
THE REAL ISSUE HERE?
I CAN RESPOND TO THAT.
IF YOU'RE TAKE THEM TO PALM
BEACH, THEN YOU'VE GOT TO DEAL
WITH THAT IF YOU'RE DEALING TO
MIAMI YOU DEAL WITH THAT BUT
WITH THE STATUTE REQUIRES YOU
TO DO, IS TO LOOK AT EACH
TRANSPORTATION OF THEM.
THAT IS THE LANGUAGE THE
LEGISLATURE USED.
IT MAY HAVE BEEN MUCH --
DOESN'T IT USE THE TERM
WORKSITE?
IT SAYS -- NO. NO LABOR POOL
MAY CHARGE MORE FOR
TRANSPORTATION TO THE WORKSITE.
IT GOES EITHER WAY, COMING OR
GOING.
A DAY LABORER.
IT DOES NOT LOOK MACRO AT DAY
LABOR POOL.
DOES LOOK AT ALL THE LABORERS.
LOOKS AT INDIVIDUAL EACH
TRANSPORTATION FOR EACH
INDIVIDUAL LABORER ON EACH DAY.
THEN BEFORE EACH ONE THERE
MAY BE A DIFFERENT GEOGRAPHIC
AREA?
ABSOLUTELY.
I'M SURE THIS CASE AND
ARGUMENTS REALLY PRESENT THAT
ALMOST SEEMS THOUGH YOU ALL
WERE TRYING TO USE JUST BROWARD
COUNTY RATES FOR EVERYBODY
INVOLVED.
BUT ONLY FOR BROWARD COUNTY
TRANSPORTS.
THAT IS ABSOLUTELY RIGHT.
ALL RIGHT.
IN FACT OUR CLASS DEFINITION
IS ONLY TRANSPORTATION WITHIN
BROWARD COUNTY.
YOU'RE NOT SEEKING DAMAGES
FOR EXAMPLE, FOR LINER'S TRIPS
FROM BROWARD TO PALM BEACH OR
BROWARD TO MIAMI?
ONLY FOR LINER'S TRIPS WITHIN
BROWARD COUNTY?
THAT'S ABSOLUTELY RIGHT.
WE TRIED NOT TO SUE WHERE WE
DIDN'T THINK THERE WAS
VIOLATION.
THAT IS WHAT CLAIMS ARE
SUPPOSED TO DO.
WE'RE TAKEN TO TASK BY THE
FOURTH DCA BECAUSE THEY THOUGHT
WE WEREN'T PLAYING CRICKET.
THE FACT WE LOOKED AT IT, WE
INITIALLY FILED SUIT AND WE HAD
CLAIMS FOR TRANSPORTATION
WITHIN MIAMI-DADE, WITHIN
BROWARD AND WITHIN PALM BEACH
COUNTY BUT WE FOUND OUT THOSE
DIDN'T HOLD WATER.
HERE IS WHAT THE ISSUE
BECOMES THEN.
I THINK THE TRIAL COURT FOUND
OR PERHAPS YOU AGREED AS WELL
THAT THE CHARGES OF 1.50
INTERCOUNTY TRIP WOULD BE
REASONABLE.
WELL, REASONABLENESS IS NOT
THE PRONG WE SUED UNDER.
WE SUED UNDER THE OBJECTIVE --
IT WOULD ALSO BE
COMMENSURATE WITH THE PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION COUNTY TO
COUNTY.
IT WOULD.
OKAY.
BUT YOUR ARGUMENT IS,
INTRACOUNTY, IN BROWARD IT IS
NOT A COMMENSURATE WITH THE
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION?
THAT'S ABSOLUTELY RIGHT.
SEEMS TO ME THE DEFENDANT'S
ARGUMENT IS THAT MAY ALL BE
TRUE, BUT WE HAVE TO TAKE OUR
CHARGES GLOBALLY BECAUSE WE
DON'T CHARGE NECESSARILY PER
TRIP.
CHARGE 1.50 WHETHER YOU'RE
GOING TO BROWARD OR PALM BEACH
OR MIAMI AND THEREFORE, WHEN
YOU TAKE EVERYTHING TOGETHER,
IT IS STILL WITHIN THE CHARGES
FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.
THAT IS -- NOT JUST LIKING
LAW AS IT'S WRITTEN.
THAT IS THEIR PROBLEM.
IT MAY BE SLIGHTLY ONEROUS.
IF THEY WANT TO CHANGE THAT
THEY GO TO THE LEGISLATURE.
THEY COULD HAVE GONE TO THE
LEGISLATURE.
IN FACT THEY DID GO TO THE
LEGISLATURE CHANGE PART OF IT.
THEY COULD HAVE GONE AND SAID,
IT'S GOING TO BE, IT COULD
CHANGE, THE LEGISLATURE SAID
A LABOR POOL MAY NOT CHARGE ITS
EMPLOYEES MORE.
YOU COULD HAVE THE LANGUAGE
OVER A PERIOD OF TIME.
THERE IS LOTS OF WAYS IT COULD
HAVE BEEN DRAFTED MACRO.
BUT THEY DIDN'T.
COULD YOU GO, YOU WERE JUST
ABOUT TO SAY I WANT TO MAKE
SURE YOU DIDN'T SUE BASED ON IT
WAS ORIGINAL AMOUNT?
THAT'S CORRECT, YOUR HONOR.
TELL ME WHAT YOU SUED BASED
ON.
LOOK AT THE LANGUAGE OF THE
STATUTE.
THE FIRST PART PROHIBITION
AGAINST CHARGING IN EXCESS
OF A REASONABLE AMOUNT.
THEN THE LEGISLATURE CAME
BEHIND THAT AND SAID, WITH A
FAIL-SAFE.
BUT IN NO EVENT MAY YOU CHARGE
MORE THAN THE PREVAILING RATE
FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN
THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA.
RIGHT.
SO, THEREFORE, AND MAYBE AGAIN,
THIS IS SORT OF LIKE TRYING TO
MAKE SURE WE'RE ALL ON THE SAME
PAGE, FOURTH DISTRICT'S FOCUS
ON REASONABLE AMOUNT IS VAGUE,
DOESN'T HAVE ANYTHING TO DO
WITH YOUR CASE?
NONE WHATSOEVER, YOUR HONOR.
IT DID NOT IN OUR COMPLAINT.
DID NOT IN OUR BRIEFING.
IT SIMPLY WAS, MISPLACED.
AND --
WE DISCUSSED PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION?
ABSOLUTELY.
WE DID.
AND WE WENT INTO THAT PRONG.
THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
OBJECTIVE PRONG IS THE
LEGISLATURE'S DETERMINATION OF
AN OUTER LIMIT OF WHAT IS
REASONABLE.
THROUGH A SCENARIO HERE IN
TERMS OF, LET'S SAY THAT YOU
HAVE THE ORGANIZATION AND THEY
NEED TO TRANSFER WORKERS AT
6:00 IN THE MORNING AND THEY
HAVE TO HAVE THEM AT A LOCATION
AT 6:30 IN ORDER FOR THE
CONTRACTOR OR THE EMPLOYER OR,
WHOEVER NEEDS THE LABOR.
AND SO IS THERE A BURDEN THEN
ON YOUR PART TO DEMONSTRATE
THAT AT 6:00 IN THE MORNING,
THAT THERE'S A BUS STOP NEAR
THE LOCATION WHERE THEY ALL
GATHER, THAT WILL GET THEM TO
THE, FOR INSTANCE, A FARM FIELD
TO PICK OR SOMETHING, AT 6:30?
IS THAT PART OF THE BURDEN
HERE?
THAT YOU HAVE TO DEMONSTRATE
THE AVAILABILITY OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION THAT WILL MEET
THE REQUIREMENTS OF WHAT HAS
BEEN CONTRACTED TO DO.
ABSOLUTELY NOT, YOUR HONOR.
HERE'S WHY.
SO WHY NOT?
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE
DIDN'T SAY THAT.
THE LEGISLATURE SAID SOMETHING
FAR BROADER.
IT SAID, THE FIRST PART OF THE
STATUTE, LOOK AT THE LANGUAGE,
IT LOOKS AT TRANSPORTATION TO
THE SITE.
BUT IT USES SAME LANGUAGE IN
THE SECOND CLAUSE.
IN THE SECOND CLAUSE, THEY WENT
TO OBJECTIVE EXTERNAL STANDARD,
A PROXY FOR WHAT WAS
OBJECTIONLY REASONABLE.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN THE
GEOGRAPHIC AREA.
THEY COULD HAVE SAID, GALLON OF
GAS OR PORTION THEREOF OR COULD
HAVE USED ANYTHING ELSE THAT
REASONABLY CORRELATED PRICE OF
TRANSPORTATION.
BUT ON THE ONE HAND YOU WANT
TO EXCLUDE THE SECOND CLAUSE
FOR ONE PURPOSE BUT APPLY IT
FOR DEFINING FIRST PROVISION.
NO, WE ONLY RELY ON THE
SECOND CLAUSE, YOUR HONOR.
I THOUGHT YOU SAID YOU WERE
SUING UNDER REASONABLE RATE
CLAUSE.
NO, YOUR HONOR.
ONLY SUING UNDER OBJECTIVE
STANDARD.
NOT USING REASONABLE RATE.
I APOLOGIZE.
BUT ISN'T THE QUESTION IS,
ARE, YOU'RE SAYING THEY'RE TWO
DIFFERENT STANDARDS.
THE FOURTH DISTRICT SEEMED TO
SAY, TWO DIFFERENT WAYS TO FIND
A VIOLATION OF THE STATUTE?
THEY ARE.
ONE IS SUBJECTIVE, ONE IS
OBJECTIVE.
THEY'RE NOT SAME THING.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
AVAILABLE, TO GET PEOPLE FROM
LOCATION A, TO THE LOCATION
THAT IS NECESSARY, WHICH IS
LOCATION B.
WHICH, YOU KNOW, MAY BE, WAY
OUT IN THE WESTERN PART, YOU
KNOW, BROWARD OR PALM BEACH
COUNTY OR WHATEVER.
THERE IS NO PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE.
AND SO WHAT HAPPENS IN THAT, IN
OTHER WORDS, WE'VE GOT SOMEBODY
THAT IS TRYING TO SUPERVISE
THIS OUTFIT AND TRYING TO
ENFORCE THIS STATUTE. SO THEY
SAY TO THEMSELVES, I'M GOING TO
GET ON TO THESE PEOPLE BECAUSE
I THINK THEY'RE PRICE GOUGE THE
WORKERS AND BUT I'VE GOT TO BE
PREPARED TO PRESENT MY CASE NOW
AND SO WHAT WOULD THEY DO?
WELL, I THINK THE ANSWER TO
THAT, AGAIN YOU GO BACK TO THE
PLAIN TEXT OF THE STATUTE.
IF YOU LOOK THE PLAIN LANGUAGE
OF THE STATUTE AND YOU DON'T
TREAT ANY LANGUAGE AS
SURPLUSAGE YOU'VE GOT TO GIVE
MEANING TO THE WORD GEOGRAPHIC.
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE SIMPLY
SAID IN THE AREA --
WHAT I'M ASKING YOU AS A
PRACTICAL MATTER, WHAT DO YOU
DO?
DO YOU GET A BUS SCHEDULE AND
SAY, JUDGE, NOW WE REALIZE THE
BUSES DON'T START UNTIL 6:30 IN
THE MORNING AND SO THERE'S NO
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AVAILABLE
EARLIER THAN 6:30.
AND WE ALSO REALIZE THAT THE
CLOSEST THAT THE BUS COMES TO
THE DESTINATION IS FIVE MILES,
AND, IT TAKES AN HOUR AND A
HALF TO GET FROM 6:30 TO,
WHATEVER AND SO, TELL ME HOW
THE CASE IS PROVEN NOW BECAUSE
WHAT WE END UP WITH, THAT WILL
GET THEM THERE AT NOON.
THAT IS NOT WHAT THE
LEGISLATURE REQUIRES THOUGH.
WHAT THE LEGISLATURE REQUIRES
IS YOU LOOK AT THE PREVAILING
RATE FOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
IN THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA AS A
PROXY.
IT DOESN'T MATTER.
THEY COULD HAVE USED THE RATE
FOR, YOU KNOW, SOMETHING ELSE
BUT --
ANSWER HIS DIRECT QUESTION.
HOW PRACTICALLY DOES IT WORK?
HE DOESN'T NEED A
DISSERTATION.
WHAT DO YOU TAKE TO THE HEARING,
TO PROVE THE CASE? JUST, --
ALL YOU TAKE TO THE HEARING
WOULD BE WHAT, TAKE EVIDENCE OF
WHAT THE MOST COMMON OR
FREQUENT RATE FOR PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION IN THE
GEOGRAPHIC AREA.
I'M SAYING ON THE GROUND,
WHAT WOULD YOU TAKE?
WOULD YOU TAKE A BUS SCHEDULE?
WOULD YOU TAKE A TAXI FARE
SITUATION?
WOULD YOU TAKE A CAR CHARTER?
WHAT WOULD YOU TAKE TO THE
HEARING TO PROVE YOUR CASE?
I'D HAVE TO PROVE WAS MOST
COMMON OR FREQUENT.
I DON'T WANT TO HEAR WORDS
MOST COMMON.
I WANT TO HEAR WHAT.
IN BROWARD WE USE THE BUS.
WE KNOW THE BCT --
EVEN THOUGH THE BUS DOESN'T
GO TO WHERE THEY'RE GOING?
ABSOLUTELY ARE.
STATUTE DOESN'T REQUIRE THAT.
NOTHING IN THE STATUTE REMOTELY
SUGGESTS YOU GO SITE TO SITE OR
AT MAIN TIMES.
OBJECTIVE PROXY.
THE IDEA WE SHOULD INDULGE IS
SITE TO SITE COMPARISON IS
OUTSIDE THE STATUTE.
JUSTICE CANTERO HAS A
QUESTION.
SEEMS TO ME IF YOU APPLY
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION AS LET'S
SAY A BUS, WHICH MAY BE
CORRECT, MAY BE INTERPRETATION
OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION, THE
COST OF PUBLIC TRANSTORETATION
IS VIRTUALLY ALWAYS GOING TO
EXCEED A REASONABLE RATE
BECAUSE BY DEFINITION, THE
PUBLIC RATE IS BELOW MARKET
BECAUSE IT IS SUBSIDIZED BY THE
COUNTY.
AND SO YOU WOULD RARELY EVER
INTERPRET THE TERM REASONABLE
RATE BECAUSE IT WOULD ALWAYS BE
ABOVE THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
RATE.
THAT MAY BE, THAT MAY BE SO
AND THAT MIGHT BE OUR
DETERMINATION AGAIN IF WE WERE
MAKING LEGISLATION BUT 1995 THE
FLORIDA LEGISLATURE DECIDED
THIS IS WHAT THEY'RE GOING TO
SAY.
IT CAN'T BE MORE THAN THE
REASONABLE RATE.
IN ANY EVENT IT CAN'T BE MORE
THAN PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.
IT MIGHT BE IN OUR OPINION MORE
THAN RANABLE OR LESS THAN
REASONABLE AMOUNT OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION RATES BUT THAT'S
WHAT THE LEGISLATURE DID.
THE FOURTH DCA DID NOT
INTERPRET OR RENDER
UNCONSTITUTIONAL SECTION 25?
NO, THEY DID NOT.
THE ISSUES THERE ARE NOT
ADDRESSED IN THE OPINION, AND
OBVIOUSLY THE GORE DECISION AND
BMW DECISION IN THE SUPREME
COURT.
PUNITIVE DAMAGE DECISIONS WE
DON'T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT THE
SUPREME COURT OF UNITED STATES
TODAY WOULD DO WITH THIS ISSUE
BUT THIS IS STATUTORY CONTEXT.
WE SUGGEST IT'S DIFFERENT FOR
THE REASONS IN OUR BRIEF.
YOU'RE MOVING RIGHT THROUGH,
BEFORE YOU SIT DOWN, NEED A
DIRECT ANSWER FROM YOU.
ABSOLUTELY.
THAT GOES BACK TO VERY FIRST
QUESTION.
I'M NOT SURE WE HEARD A DIRECT
ANSWER.
OKAY.
DO YOU APPLY THE SAME
STANDARDS IN CASE IN EVALUATING
THESE YOU WOULD IN A CRIMINAL
STATUTE AS JUDGE BROCH IN
OPINION BELOW.
YOU WOULD NOT USE THE SAME
STANDARDS IN THIS CASE.
AND WHY?
TWO REASONS, ONE, THREE.
AT LEAST TWO REASONS.
ONE THAT THE LEGISLATURE
EXPRESSLY MANDATED THAT IT BE
CONSTRUED TO CARRY OUT ITS
EFFECT.
SO I THINK THAT ONE PART.
THE OTHER PART IS YOU HAVE TWO
DIFFERENT STATUTES AND THE
REMEDY IS NECESSARILY GOING TO
BE $1,000.
FOR EXAMPLE, IF THE $1,000
PROVISION WERE STRUCK YOU ONLY
HAVE ACTUAL DAMAGES.
BECAUSE THEY ARE DISCRETE, WE
WOULD SUGGEST THERE HAS GOT TO
BE HYBRID ANALYSIS HERE.
IT SLIGHTLY COMPLEX QUESTION.
WE DO RECOGNIZE THAT IT'S
PUNITIVE ON THE $1,000 PRONG.
IT HAS TO BE STRICTLY CONSTRUED
AS APPLICATION.
THIRD BASIS.
YOU SAID THERE ARE THREE
REASONS.
YOU GAVE ME TWO.
ONE WAS THE LEGISLATURE SAID
SO.
RIGHT.
TWO WAS THAT THEY ARE
SEPARATE.
RIGHT.
AND THREE IS THAT WITHIN THE
SEPARATE STATUTE IT IS
POSSIBILITY OF NOT BEING
$1,000.
IT COULD JUST BE ACTUAL
DAMAGES.
BUT ON THAT, IF YOU AS
APPLIED, SINCE YOU'RE SEEKING
$1,000, IF YOU WERE ONLY
SEEKING A SMALLER AMOUNT, IT
SEEMS TO ME THAT YOU CANNOT BE
SEEKING SOMETHING YOU ADMIT IS
PENAL AND THEN SHOULDN'T SAY
THE STATUTE SHOULD BE STRICTLY
CONSTRUED AND SEMINAL PRINCIPLES
ABOUT VAGUENESS COME INTO PLAY?
WELL I THINK THE CRIMINAL
CONCERNS ABOUT VAGUENESS DO
COME INTO EFFECT IN APPLICATION
OF THE $1,000 PENALTY.
THERE IS NO WAY OF GETTING
AROUND THAT.
THERE REALLY ISN'T, BUT WHAT
I'M SAYING IS IT COULD BE
STRUCK AND WE WOULD THEN BE
ENTITLED FALL BACK TO THE
ACTUAL DAMAGES.
AND THE POINT OF THAT IT
BUTTRESSES THE SEPARATION OF
448.24 AND 448.25.
IF IT'S NOT LIKE IN CRIMINAL
CONTEXT WHERE ALWAYS
NECESSARILY FLOWS.
THAT'S MY POINT.
OKAY.
IT IS A COMPLEX QUESTION.
OKAY.
RESPONSE?
MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT.
TODD PITTENGER ON BEHALF OF THE
APPELLEE, WORKERS TEMPORARY
SERVICES.
IN RESPONSE TO THE JUDGE'S
QUESTION ON THE STANDARD, WE
WOULD SUGGEST THE FOURTH DCA
AND TRIAL COURT DID APPLY THE
CORRECT STANDARD FROM BROWN v.
STATE IT IS IN THE STAPLE IN
CONTEXT BECAUSE OF THE PUNITIVE
ASPECT OF THE STATUTE AND THERE
ARE EXAMPLES IN THIS COURT'S
CASE LAW, ABA INDUSTRIES CASE
WHERE ANNEXATION WAS CONTEXT
AND QUESTION WHETHER
PREDOMINANTLY OPENED WAS VAGUE
OR NOT.
THAT WAS CIVIL CONTEXT YET THE
VAGUENESS STANDARD WOULD STILL
APPLY.
THE DIFFERENCE AS YOU WELL KNOW
IS WHETHER STRICT SCRUTINY IS
APPLIED OR NOT.
IT IS THE PUNITIVE ASPECT OF
THIS STATUTE, THE STATUTORY
HAMMER IS WHAT THE FOURTH
DISTRICT CALLED IT, THE, TRIAL
JUDGE REFERED TO THE PUNITIVE
ASPECTS OF THE STATUTE.
THE RATIO.
LET ME ASK YOU THIS
QUESTION.
THE OPPOSITION SAID OKAY, I'M
GOING TO ACCEPT AS TO THE PENAL
AND SAYS THAT PART CAN BE
SEVERED FROM THE REST OF THE
STATUTE.
IS THAT INCORRECT OR
TELL US YOUR VIEW WITH REGARD
TO THAT ASPECT.
WE DO NOT AGREE THEY CAN BE
SEVERED BECAUSE IT IS THE
SERIOUSNESS OF THE PUNITIVE
SANCTION HERE THAT IMPLICATES
THE VAGUENESS CONCERN AND MAKES
IT MUCH MORE HEIGHTENED.
IF WE WERE TALKING ABOUT MUCH
LESSER SANCTION IT WOULD BE
HELD TO LESSER STANDARD.
THAT'S WHAT I THINK HE IS
ARGUING THAT OKAY, I'M ALMOST,
I THINK THAT'S WHAT THEY'RE
SAYING THAT, OKAY AS TO THAT
PART BUT THAT PART, IF SOMEONE
SAYS, THIS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE WITH
REGARD TO IMPROPOSING A
PENALTY.
DOES IT NECESSARILY FOLLOW
THOUGH THAT IF YOU STRIKE THAT
YOU HAVE TO SAY THIS IS
UNNECESSARILY VAGUE AS A
REMEDIAL STATUTE UPON STRIKING
THE PENALTY ASPECT?
WE WOULD SUGGEST THE STATUTE
WOULD STILL HAVE TO BE STRICKEN
FOR TWO REASONS.
OKAY.
ONE, THE REASONABLE AMOUNT
REFERENCE WHICH HAS NOTHING TO
DO WITH STATUTORY DAMAGE THAT
THE COURT JUST REFERS TO, IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE.
WHAT DO YOU DO WITH THE
STATUTE, CIVIL STATUTES THAT
TALK ABOUT REASONABLE ATTORNEYS
FEES?
THE CONCEPT OF REASONABLENESS
IS THROUGHOUT, SPRINKLED ALL
OVER OUR STATUTES.
AND OUR CONSTITUTION.
THAT IS TRUE, YOUR HONOR BUT
IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS STATUTE,
NO LABOR POOL SHALL CHARGE A
DAY LABORER A REASONABLE AMOUNT
TO TRANSPORT A WORKER TO OR
FROM THE DESIGNATED
WORKSITE.
WOULD REQUIRE FOR EVERY DAY
LABORER CASE ON EVERY SINGLE
WORKSITE TO DETERMINE A
REASONABLE AMOUNT.
THEY'RE SAYING THEY DIDN'T
EVEN GO ON THE REASONABLE
AMOUNT.
THEY'RE GOING ON PREVAILING
RATE, THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA FOR
PUBLIC TRANSTATION.
WHAT'S VAGUE ABOUT THAT?
THAT IS A PRETTY, I MEAN, YOU
KNOW, WE'RE NOT, WE'RE TALKING
ABOUT AN EVIL WHICH THE
LEGISLATURE WANTED TO ELIMINATE
WHICH ASSUME IS THAT THESE
LABOR POOLS WERE TAKING
ADVANTAGE OF POOR PEOPLE BY
GOUGING THEM ON CHARGING MORE
THAN THEY SHOULD HAVE FOR
TRANSPORTING THEM TO PLACE.
SO LET'S JUST, IN TERMS OF
WHAT'S GOING ON HERE.
I LOOK AT THIS A, OWNER OF A
DAY LABOR POOL, AND I GO, I
CAN'T CHARGE THEM MORE THAN
WHATEVER THE PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION WOULD BE TO AND
FROM.
SO I LOOK AND I, GET MY BUS
SCHEDULES OUT AND I TAKE CARE
OF IT.
AND THEN HOPEFULLY I CAN
SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND MYSELF BUT
BY SAYING I HAVE CHARGED A
PROPER RATE.
NOT SURE, I DON'T KNOW, YOU
KNOW, OTHER THAN SAYING AN
AMOUNT, WHICH THEY HAVE NOW
DONE, BUT THAT CAN VARY FROM
YEAR TO YEAR GOING TO HAVE TO
KEEP ON CHANGING THAT MAYBE
UPWARD FOR, YOU KNOW, YOUR
BENEFIT.
THAT SEEMS TO ME PRETTY, BETTER
THAN REASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES.
IT SEEMS PRETTY, PRETTY
OBJECTIVE.
YOUR HONOR, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT, LOOKING FROM THE
VAGUENESS STANDPOINT, YOU LOOK
AT IT FROM THE STANDPOINT LIKE
YOU SAID OF THE LABOR POOL
COMPANY, TRYING TO CONFORM ITS
STANDARD TO THE LAW.
WHAT IS SO HARD ABOUT THAT?
THAT'S WHAT I'M TRYING TO
UNDERSTAND.
IT'S NOT THEY'RE GOING, GEE,
HOW AM I TO FIGURE OUT HOW TO
CHARGE A REASONABLE AMOUNT.
IT SAYS, THAT THEY LOOK AT THE
PREVAILING RATE FOR PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION.
WELL, GEE, SHOULD I USE BUS OR
SHOULD I USE, YOU KNOW,
LIMOUSINE.
WELL, YOU KNOW, PRESUMABLY, IF
THEY WENT THROUGH AND MADE A
GOOD-FAITH EFFORT, THEN, THEY
CAN SUCCESSFULLY DEFEND THEY
HAVEN'T EXCEEDED DAILY RATE FOR
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION TO THE
DESIGNATED WORKSITE.
IF THEY SIMPLY SAY, I'M GOING
TO SAY $6 IS REASONABLE AMOUNT,
THIS CAN'T BE CHALLENGED THEN
IT'S A DIFFERENT SITUATION.
SSO, YOU KNOW, FRANKLY ALTHOUGH
I APPRECIATE THAT MAYBE
REASONABLE AMOUNT OUT OF
CONTEXT COULD BE VAGUE, I DON'T
SEE HOW IN THE CONTEXT OF THIS
STATUTE AND WHAT YOU HAD TO
LOOK AT, IT'S VERY DIFFICULT TO
FIGURE OUT THAT YOU'RE NOT PUT
ON NOTICE, OF, WHAT YOU WERE
SUPPOSED TO DO, WEREN'T
SUPPOSED TO GOUGE YOUR PEOPLE
WORKING FOR YOU.
JUDGE, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE
PRESENTED A TRIAL THERE WAS ANY
GOUGING HERE.
$1.50 --
MAYBE YOU'RE GOING TO WIN
ON, I DON'T KNOW, IS THIS ISSUE
WE HOLD THIS CONSTITUTIONAL
THEY WIN OR IS THERE SOME
DETERMINATION THAT HAS TO BE
MADE?
PROBLEM TRIAL COURT FACED
WAS FIRST IN CONSTRUING THE
STATUTE.
WITH WE DISAGREE TOTALLY WITH
OPPOSING COUNSEL THERE ARE TWO
CLAUSES IN THIS STATUTE.
THERE ARE NOT.
STATUTE MUST BE CONSTRUED.
THE MEANING TO AND FROM THE
DESIGNATED IN FIRST SITE IN THE
FIRST CLAUSE DESCRIBE WHAT IS
THE AMOUNT IS THAT CAN'T EXCEED
THE PREVAILING RATE FOR PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION IN THE
GEOGRAPHIC AREA.
THOSE TWO ARE LINKED.
PROBLEM AS ONE OF THE OTHER
JUSTICES SAID WE PUT ON
UNREBUTTED EVIDENCE, 60% OF THE
WORK SITES BY MR.^LINER COULD
NOT BE REACHED WHICH BUS.
THIS STATUTE IS INTENDED TO
ESTABLISH UNIFORM STANDARD
THROUGHOUT THE STATE IS WHAT
44.21 SAYS.
WE HAVE 67 COUNTIES IN THIS
STATE.
MAJORITY WITHOUT ESTABLISHED
BUS SYSTEMS.
IF THE MOST URBAN SETTING THAT
WE HAVE IN THIS STATE HAS 60%
NOT SERVICED BY THE BUS, IT IS
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT NOT
INTUITIVE AND NOT AUTOMATIC
FROM THE LABOR POOL STANDPOINT
THAT YOU WOULD LOOK TO THE
BECAUSE THE BUS DOES NOT GET
THE WORKER TO AND FROM THE
DESIGNATED WORKSITE.
DOESN'T THAT MEAN THOUGH,
THEY MIGHT NOT BE ABLE TO
SUCCESSFULLY PROSECUTE A CLAIM,
YOU KNOW WHERE THERE IS NO
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
AVAILABLE?
BUT WHAT IS WRONG WITH THE
REASONABLENESS IN TERMS OF YOU
KNOW, WHY COULDN'T YOU BRING IN
FOR INSTANCE, THE MANAGER OF A
CAB COMPANY WHO SAYS LOOK, YOU
KNOW, WE HAVE A VEHICLE, AND,
WE GET DEPRECIATION ON THE
VEHICLE.
WE HAVE TO PAY A DRIVER OKAY.
GAS HAS GONE THROUGH THE ROOF.
AND WE HAVE TO, YOU KNOW,
CHARGE FOR GAS.
AND THEN WE WANT A LITTLE BIT
OF PROFIT.
AND THEREFORE, WE BELIEVE WE
CAN DEFEND OUR CHARGE AS BEING
EXTREMELY REASONABLE, THAT IS
THAT, IN REALITY THEY COULDN'T
EVEN GET TRANSPORTATION OUT
THERE, MUCH LESS GET IT FOR THE
REASONABLE PRICE THAT WE
CHARGE?
SO WHY CAN'T, IN OTHER WORDS,
PEOPLE EVERY DAY FIGURE OUT IF
THEY'RE GOING TO USE A VEHICLE
IN THEIR BUSINESS, WHETHER IT'S
A TRUCK, OR A TAXICAB OR A
LIMOUSINE OR WHATEVER.
HOW TO COMPUTE A REASONABLE
CHARGE OUT OF THAT.
THERE MAY BE SOME RANGE.
BUT WHY ISN'T THAT A DOABLE
THING?
JUDGE, WE DID EXACT EXACTLY
WHAT YOU DESCRIBE.
YOU'RE EXACTLY RIGHT.
WE PUT ON THAT CASE IN TRIAL
THESE DAYS OVER JUDGE CARNEY.
WE DID NOT NO WHETHER THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE WOULD BE
RULED AND HE RULED IN FAVOR ON
THAT ISSUE AS WELL.
WHAT DID HE RULE?
HE FOUND IN THE LAST PART OF
HIS ORDER EVEN IF THE STATUTE
IS FOUND CONSTITUTIONAL, THAT
LARRY LINER STILL LOSES BECAUSE
THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA AS
ESTABLISHED BY THE EVIDENCE WAS
TRICOUNTY.
WE FRAMED PART OF THE ISSUES IN
THIS CASE, IT WASN'T JUST
THEIR PLEADING.
WE HAD A COUNTERCLAIM THAT WAS
ALSO TRIED.
OUR COUNTERCLAIM SAID WE
BELIEVE WE OUR CONDUCT WAS IN
CONFORMANCE WITH THE LAW.
WE ALSO CHALLENGED
CONSTITUTIONALITY IN OUR ANSWER
WE RAISED AND UNDISPUTED,
MR.^LINER WENT TO 245 WORK
SITES.
57 OF THOSE WERE IN MIAMI-DADE
OR PALM BEACH.
ONLY 177 WERE BROWARD.
WHY DID YOU DECIDE THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUE THEN IF IT
COULD BE DECIDED ON A FACTUAL
BASIS?
THAT IS, I'M AWARE OF THE
PRECEPT.
THAT IS EXCELLENT POINT.
WE WOULD SUGGEST THAT AFTER
WORKING WITH THIS THROUGH THE
TRIAL, THE TRIAL JUDGE HAD NO
REAL OPTION BUT TO FIND IT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONALLY VAGUE IN
TERMS OF HOW IT WORK.
WHY, IF HE FOUND THAT YOU
HAD PROVEN UP THAT YOUR CHARGES
WERE REASONABLE, WHY NOT JUST
STOP RIGHT THERE.
WE WERE CONTENDING WITH THE
FACT THE PLAINTIFF'S, APPELLANTS
HERE WERE ATTEMPTING TO GET WAY
FROM REASONABLE ISSUE.
THEY KEPT SAYING IT WAS NOT
PART OF IT.
WE INTRODUCED EVIDENCE.
THERE WERE MOTIONS IN LIMINE
WERE DENIED.
IN THE END
IN TERMS OF FACTUAL RECORD
CREATED BEFORE HIM.
IF THIS STATUTE IS DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, YOUR
CLIENT IN ESSENCE WOULD GET TO
CHARGE WHATEVER THEY WANT TO
FOR THIS TRANSPORTATION?
$1.50 IS THE STATUTORY
MAXIMUM HERE.
THAT'S NOW.
IF WE'RE TALKING ABOUT OLD
STATUTE, WE'RE NOT EVEN
CONSIDERING THE CHANGE.
YOUR CLIENTS COULD HAVE THEN
CHARGED ANYTHING?
IT WAS PUT IN THE RECORD SO
IT'S UNDISPUTED HERE WE NEVER
CHARGED ANYTHING OTHER THAN
1.50.
WE'RE ONLY TALKING ABOUT THIS
WINDOW OF TIME IN THE PAST
WHERE THE OLD STATUTE WAS IN
EFFECT.
SINCE JULY 2006 THE RULE HAS
BEEN 1.50.
IT WOULDN'T ENABLE US TO DO
ANYTHING DIFFERENT.
DID THE JUDGE MAKE FACTUAL
FINDING ON BASIS OF THIS RECORD
WHAT A REASONABLE AMOUNT WAS?
THE JUDGE DID NOT DO THAT.
HE DID NOT.
HE SAID ACTUALLY IN HIS
FINDINGS, WE CHARGED OUR RATE
WAS LESS THAN INTERCOUNTY
TRAVEL.
WAS LESS THAN PALM BEACH
TRAVEL.
LESS THAN MIAMI-DADE TRAVEL.
THAT IS NOT THE QUESTION.
I'M REALLY STRUGGLING WHY
ANYONE WOULD USE A
TRANSPORTATION COST FROM POINT
A, TO A POINT B THAT'S NOT PART
OF THE DISPUTE?
WHY WOULD WE LOOK TO WHAT IT
COST TO GO FROM A TO B IF
THAT'S NOT WHERE THE PERSON WAS
GOING?
IF IT THE PERSON WAS GOING TO
C, THAT'S WHERE THE CLAIM IS,
IT'S ONLY WITHIN, FOR THOSE
TRANSPORTS WITHIN THE COUNTY,
THAT IT'S EXCESSIVE, HOW DO
WE GET TO JUST, WE COULD SAY,
WELL, GEOGRAPHIC AREA IS
FLORIDA.
THAT'S WHAT I'M MISSING.
DO WE GET YOU HAVE TO LOOK AT
WHAT IT IS IN MIAMI WHEN, AS I
UNDERSTAND IT, THE CLAIM IN
THIS CASE IS FOR TRANSPORTS
WITHIN BROWARD COUNTY?
THEY STARTED SUING FOR THREE
COUNTIES.
BUT THAT'S OUT OF IT.
THEY MISSED THAT.
THREE MONTHS BEFORE THE
TRIAL THEY AMENDED THEIR
COMPLAINT.
SO THAT'S OUT.
NOW WE'RE TALKING ABOUT JUST IN
BROWARD.
BUT OUR, WHAT THE CASE WE
PRESENT AND AND WHAT THE TRIAL
COURT ACCEPTED AND FOURTH DCA
DID AS WELL WAS THE GEOGRAPHIC
AREA -- THE LEGISLATURE KNOWS
THAT THE WORD COUNTY EXISTS.
THEY COULD HAVE USED THE WORD
COUNTY.
THAT'S THE REASON.
JUST BECAUSE THAT PHRASE, YOU
COULD LOOK ALL GEOGRAPHIC AREA
DOWN TO KEY WEST THEN.
IT WOULD ONLY BE GEOGRAPHIC
AREA THAT LABOR HALL SERVICED.
IT'S WHAT THEY SERVICE
WHEREVER THEIR ROUTES MAY BE.
AND COINCIDENTALLY HERE
WHERE LARRY LINER WORKED.
UNREFUTED EVIDENCE --
WAS NOT MAKING A CLAIM WHEN
YOU TRANSPORTED HIM TO DADE.
WHAT THAT GETS TO AS JUDGE
CARNEY AT THE TRIAL COURT
CHARACTERIZED IT WAS CHERRY-PICKING
THE CLAIM.
WHAT YOU'RE SAYING YOU DON'T
LOOK WHAT HE IS ACTUALLY
CLAIMING FOR THOSE TRANSPORTS
WITHIN; YOU LOOK WHETHER THIS
IS GENERALLY REASONABLE FEE IN
THIS WHOLE AREA WHERE THEY DO
BUSINESS?
YES, YOUR HONOR.
OKAY.
SECONDLY HOW DID WE GET TO
LIMOUSINES AND DISCUSSION OF
LIMOUSINES OUT OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORT?
THEY HAVE, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT TO THE APPELLANT,
GROSSLY TAKEN JUDGE CARNEY'S
COMMENTS IN THE ORDER OUT OF
CONTEXT.
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED IN THE
STATUTES WE JUDICIARY NOTICED
WORDS PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
DEFINED MULTIPLE TIMES IN OTHER
FLORIDA STATUTES CITED IN OUR
BRIEF TO INCLUDE A VERY BROAD
RANGE OF THINGS EVEN GO SO FAR
AS TAXI CABS.
YOU'RE NOT SUGGESTING LIMOS?
NO.
YOU'RE NOT SUGGESTING THIS
IS TALKING ABOUT PERSONAL,
PRIVATE CAR TRANSPORT, IT'S
TALKING ABOUT --
NO.
-- WHAT IS COMMONLY UNDERSTOOD
AS PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION BUT
BROADER THAN BUS.
WHAT ELSE IS THERE IN SOUTH
FLORIDA?
DOWN THERE WE HAVE THE
TRI-RAIL.
TRI-RAIL.
THERE IS PARATRANSIT.
DO YOU HAVE A JITNEY SERVICE,
LITTLE BUSES?
WE PUT ON EVIDENCE AT TRIAL
ABOUT A VAN POOL PROGRAM THAT
ALSO QUALIFIED AS PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION.
THE COST OF THAT EXCEED WHAT
HAD WE CHARGED.
BASICALLY EVERYTHING --
I NO HE THAT IN DADE COUNTY
THE COUNTY OFFERS A PARATRANSIT
WHERE SOMEBODY WILL COME
DOOR-TO-DOOR, PICK UP PEOPLE
AND, TAKE THEM FOR $3 WHEREVER
THEY WANT.
IT'S A SUBSIDIZED.
THERE IS ALSO, PLACES LIKE
JUSTICE ANSTEAD SAYING A JITNEY
TAKES CASES ALL OVER THE PLACE.
ARE YOU ARGUING THAT
TRANSPORTATION INCLUDES MORE
THAN BUS, LESS THAN LIMOUSINES?
IT INCLUDES LIMOUSINES OUT
OF THE PICTURE.
IT INCLUDES DEFINITELY MORE
THAN BUSES.
THE PROMISE, WITH THIS STATUTE
INSOFAR VAGUENESS IS CONCERNED
IS PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IS NOT
DEFINED.
IF THAT LABOR HALL COMPANY
WANTED TO CONFORM ITS CONDUCT
TO THE LAW WHERE YOU START FOR
VAGUENESS PURPOSES, IF THEY
LOOKED TO THOSE OTHER STATUTES
THEY WOULD FIND VERY BROAD
DEFINITIONS.
NOTHING --
IF YOU GO BACK TO THIS,
LOGICAL, GO AND SAY WE START
WITH PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION.
MOST PEOPLE THINK BUS.
BUS, TRAIN.
YOU DON'T THINK PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION, LIMOUSINE.
SO IN TERMS OF WHAT'S
REASONABLE YOU GO, WELL IF
THERE IS NO BUS SERVICE, TO
PLACES, THEN, YOU MIGHT HAVE TO
OTHER THINGS BUT, THAT'S A
HYPOTHETICAL SITUATION.
SO NOW WE'RE TALKING ABOUT
WHETHER THIS IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE.
OR WHETHER IT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED.
RIGHT NOW BECAUSE JUDGE CARNEY
FOUND THAT THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA
WAS THE TRICOUNTY AREA, HE SAID
THERE WAS NO VIOLATION.
BUT IF WE SAY, WE DON'T THINK
THIS IS NECESSARILY
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON ITS FACE,
BECAUSE THERE ARE PARAMETERS,
IT COULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
APPLIED BUT, IN THIS SITUATION,
WE DON'T AGREE THAT GEOGRAPHIC
AREA MEANS TRICOUNTY.
IT MEANS, YOU KNOW, HERE,
BROWARD COUNTY.
IT MIGHT MEAN SOMETHING
DIFFERENT UP IN JUSTICE BELL'S
NECK OF THE WOOD I DON'T KNOW
HOW THEY GET AROUND THERE.
HORSE AND BUGGY I THINK.
WE INCLUDE ALABAMA TOO.
AND THEN IT GOES BACK WITH
THAT AND MAYBE, THEN, IF THEY
START TO USE SOMETHING THAT IS
UNREASONABLE AND YOU SAY THIS,
IS HOW WE DID IT AND IT LOOKED
REASONABLE AND STILL YOU WERE
FOUND TO BE LIABLE, MAYBE YOU
WOULD HAVE ANOTHER BASIS FOR
MAKING THIS CLAIM.
BUT I THINK THAT TO ME IS
PREMATURE.
WHY ISN'T THAT THE BETTER WAY
TO APPROACH IT THAT IS, SAY,
IT'S NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL ON
ITS FACE?
IT COULD BE UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
APPLIED, BUT WE DON'T SEE
ANYTHING THAT JUMPS OUT AT US
RIGHT NOW THAT MAKES IT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS APPLIED
HOWEVER WE DON'T AGREE THE
GEOGRAPHIC AREA HAS TO MEAN FOR
THIS CASE THE TRICOUNTY IF
THERE ARE ONLY TRANSPORTING IN
BROWARD AND LET IT GO BACK AND
SEE WHAT, YOU KNOW, HOW IT
FALLS?
JUDGE, WE PRESENTED AT THE
TRIAL AND AT APPELLATE CHALLENGE.
AGAIN WE DIDN'T KNOW FACIALLY
IT WOULD COME OUT THE WAY IT
DID.
SO THERE WAS FULLY DIRECTED,
FULLY DEVELOPED TRIAL RECORD TO
ESTABLISH AS APPLIED TO US THE
STATUTE FROM OUR STANDPOINT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
THE RECORDS THERE, WOULDN'T
HAVE TO BE ANYTHING FURTHER
DONE.
THE REFERENCE TO CABS AND
LIMOS YOU MENTIONED AT
BEGINNING OF YOUR QUESTION, I
MEAN THE KEY TO THAT THE
LYNCHPIN FROM OUR STANDPOINT IN
ANALYSIS OF THIS STATUTE IS TO
AND FROM DESING FATED WORKSITE.
YOU CANNOT DIVORCE THAT.
TAXICAB WILL GET YOU THERE.
VAN POOL WILL GET YOU THERE.
IT'S DOOR-TO-DOOR.
IN CONTEXT 60% OF THE WORK
SITES IN THIS VERY URBAN COUNTY
EVIDENCE WAS UNREFUTED IT
DOESN'T GET, THE BUS DOESN'T GET
THERE.
JUST NEEDS COMMON SENSE TO
ME WHAT THE STATUTE IS TRYING
TO ACHIEVE IN YOUR LINE OF
BUSINESS, YOUR THEY HAVE TO
COME TO THIS CENTRAL SITE TO BE
COMMONLY TRANSPORTED TO THE JOB
SITE CORRECT?
YES.
SO WHAT THE INTENT IS, IF
THAT WERE NOT REQUIREMENT.
IF THAT WORKER HAD TO FIND
TRANSPORTATION TO THAT JOB SITE
WHAT WOULD IT REASONABLY COST
FOR YOU NOT TO CHARGE MORE THAN
THAT?
RIGHT, BY ALL MEASURES BASED
ON THE RECORD THERE WE CHARGED
FAR LESS.
UNREFUTED EVIDENCE WAS WE LOST
$40,000 A YEAR IN TRANSPORTING
WORKERS.
WE ONLY RECOVERED 2,000 AND
CHANGE THE FIRST.
4,000 THE SECOND YEAR.
$300 THE THIRD YEAR DURING HIS
2-YEAR PERIOD.
I GUESS I DON'T KNOW WHY IS
IT, AGAIN, WHY DIDN'T JUDGE
CARNEY MAKE ALTERNATIVE FINDING
EVEN IF IT WAS TRICOUNTY AREA,
EVEN IF LIMITED TO BROWARD, IT
WAS WOULD STILL BE THAT YOU
CHARGED, THAT YOU DID CHARGE A
REASONABLE MANNER?
THE PROBLEM JUDGE CARNEY WAS
FACED WITH, LIKE THE APPELLANT
IS DOING TODAY.
THEY ARE TRYING TO SUGGEST
THERE ARE TWO DIFFERENT CLAUSES
IN THE STATUTE.
THEY'RE NOT ARGUING REASONABLE
AMOUNT.
I WOULD SUGGEST THEY CONCEDED
WE CHARGED REASONABLE AMOUNT
BUT THEY MAY NOT AGREE WITH
THAT CONCESSION.
SO JUDGE CARNEY WAS LEFT WITH
DEALING WITH THE LANGUAGE OF
THIS PART OF THE STATUTE THAT
TRIAL WAS MOSTLY ABOUT BUT IN
NO EVENT SHALL THE AMOUNT
AMOUNT, THE AMOUNT TO TRANSPORT
THE WORKER TO AND FROM THE
DESIGNATED WORKSITE SHALL
EXCEED THE PREVEILING RATE FOR
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN THE
GEE AREA.
HE HAD TO WRESTLE WITH ALL
THOSE TERMS.
THAT SAYS THE SECOND CLAUSE
DEFINES CAN YOU CHARGE MORE
THAN THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
TO AND FROM THE DESIGNATED
AREA?
YOU AGREE WITH THAT?
YES.
THEY ARE RELATED.
THE AMOUNT IS TO AND FROM THE
DESIGNATED WORKSITE.
SO IF YOU CHARGE MORE THAN
THE PUBLIC COST OF THE PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION, WOULD YOU BE
VIOLATING STATUTE EVEN THOUGH
IT WAS A REASONABLE AMOUNT FROM
YOUR POINT OF VIEW WHERE YOU
COULD MAKE A PROFIT?
NOT IF THE BUS DOESN'T GET
YOU THERE.
BECAUSE THEN THE BUS IS NOT
COMPARABLE MEANS OF PUBLICS
TRANSPORTATION.
WHAT YOU'RE SAYING IN THIS
CASE, WE'RE TALKING ABOUT
BROWARD COUNTY.
WAS THERE TESTIMONY THAT
MR.^LINER WAS GOING WAS NOT
COVERED BY --
YES, UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY.
60% OF THE WORK SITES.
WHAT WAS EVIDENCE PUT ON AS
TO OTHER METHODS OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION WITHIN THE
COUNTY OTHER THAN BUS?
OUR TRANSPORTATION EXPERT
TESTIFIED.
WE ALSO HAD MOLLY HUES THE
DIRECTOR AFTER VAN POOL PROGRAM
WITH TRICOUNTY AREA.
THAT TESTIMONY WAS ALL OF
RECORD.
WHAT WERE THE CHARGES?
THE VAN POOL BROKE DOWN WHEN
YOU DIVIDED DO THE MOST BENEFIT
OF THE DOUBT HOW MANY
PASSENGERS IN THE VAN, ROUGHLY
$6, IN THE 5 TO $6 RANGE.
IS PRIVATE OR PUBLICLY
OWNED?
IT'S PUBLICLY SUBSIDIZED.
GIVING CREDIT FOR ALL PUBLIC
SUBSIDIES.
WHY DIDN'T THE JUDGE SAY,
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IS
DEFINED NOT ONLY INCLUDING
BUS BUT A VAN POOL AND
THESE CHARGES ARE A,
REASONABLE, AND B, NOT MORE
THAN THE PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
AVAILABLE TO GO
DOOR TO DOOR
WHICH WOULD NOT BE A BUS, IT
WOULD BE A VAN POOL?
THE JUDGE, THE JUDGE DID NOT
GO SO FAR AND WE DIDN'T URGE
HIM TO GO SO FAR AS TO TRY TO
SET PREVAILING RATE FOR THE
COUNTY OR FOR THE GEOGRAPHIC
AREA OR FOR ANYTHING.
ONCE HE HAD CONCLUDED STATUTE
WAS UNWORKABLE AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL IT REALLY
WOULD HAVE BEEN NOT CONDUCIVE
WITH THAT TO MAKE THAT RATE
SETTING.
PLUS IT WAS OUR SUGGESTION TO
HIM, AND WE DO MAINTAIN IT'S
NOT BURDEN OF LABOR HALLS TO GO
SETTING RATES HERE FOR
EVERYBODY UNDER ALL
CIRCUMSTANCES.
BECAUSE THE LEGISLATURE USED TO
AND FROM THE DESIGNATED
WORKSITE THEY CREATED SITUATION
WHERE IT'S VIRTUALLY IMPOSSIBLE
TO SET A PREVAILING RATE.
THIS WAS ON THE BOOKS FROM
1995?
YES, YOUR HONOR.
THIS IS THE FIRST CASE THAT
EVER WAS BROUGHT UNDER IT.
IT IS THE FIRST.
FIRST TIME ALL THESE YEARS,
WHO KNOWS WHAT WAS GOING ON,
SOMEONE TRIES TO YOU KNOW,
BRING IN A LABOR POOL TO BE A
ACCOUNTABLE AND NOW THEY RAISE
CONSTITUTIONAL GROUNDS.
THAT IS FOR CHARGING $1.50.
LOSING $40,000 OVER TWO YEARS.
PER YEAR.
AND WE WOULD SUGGEST THERE
WAS NO EXTORTION.
THERE WAS NO FINDING IN ANY
SORT OF ABUSE OF LABORERS IN
THIS CONTEXT.
THAT RECORD WAS NOT CREATED
HERE.
WE LOST MONEY ON TRANSPORTATION
AND EGREGIOUS PUNITIVE EFFECT
OF THIS STATUTORY HAMMER.
50 CENTS TO 1,000.
I DON'T KNOW.
SEEM TO ME AS FACT-FINDER YOU
PRESENTED EVIDENCE THAT SHOWS
THAT IT WAS FIRST OF ALL YOU
KNEW HOW TO DEFEND THIS CASE.
YOU KNEW HOW TO ESTABLISH WHAT
WAS PREVAILING RATE.
AND YOU DID THAT.
THAT'S WHAT YOU'RE REELING
TELLING US.
NOT THAT YOU DIDN'T KNOW WHAT A
REASONABLE RATE WAS BECAUSE YOU
KNEW HOW, YOU UNDERSTOOD WHAT
THE STATUTE SAID AND YOU ABIDED
BY IT.
WELL, RESPECTFULLY THE
PROBLEM WITH THE STATUTE IS IT
DOESN'T CREATE THE GUIDEPOST
THAT THE LEGISLATURE IS
SUPPOSED TO DO.
WHERE IS THE CLEAR AND DEFINITE
WARNING WHAT THE CONDUCT
PROHIBITED IS?
BY NOT TELLING US GEOGRAPHIC
AREA WE'RE LEFT TO GUESS
WHETHER THE GEOGRAPHIC AREA
WHERE WE SERVICE, WHERE HE GOES
OR SOME COMBINATION OF THE TWO.
BY NOT DEFINING WHAT PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION IS --
WHAT SHE IS GETTING BACK TO,
DO YOU HAVE TO HAVE AS APPLIED
TO YOU, UNDER THESE
CIRCUMSTANCES YOU'VE PROVED
EVERYTHING, THERE IS NO
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION.
THE WINNER.
AND YET WE'VE GOT A STATUTE
DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
THERE IS SOMETHING WRONG WITH
THIS PICK YOU ARE.
THE WAY YOU DESCRIBE IT YOU WIN
ON EVERY ISSUE.
WHAT THE EVIDENCE IS.
AND YET WE'RE FACED WITH
DECLARING STATUTES
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
BUT WE WOULD BE SUBJECTIVE
AS WOULD ENTIRE LABOR POOL
INDUSTRY HAPPENING AGAIN AND
AGAIN AND AGAIN.
THAT IS THE SIN, WITH ALL DUE
RESPECT OF A VAGUE STATUTE.
BY NOT HAVING CLEAR GUIDEPOSTS
THESE REASONABLENESS TRIALS
WOULD BE ENDLESS.
EVERY DAY LABORER SUING, MERE
THREAT OF THAT WOULD CREATE
PUNITIVE EFFECT.
JUSTICE WELLS HAS A
QUESTION.
I ASSUME THAT, YOUR POSITION
IS THAT EVEN THOUGH YOU AS,
JUSTICE PARIENTE SAID PROVEN
YOU DONE EVERYTHING YOU COULD
DO, YOU LOST $40,000 CLAIM
THERE IS CLAIM BEING MADE YOU
SHOULD HAVE ONLY CHARGED A
DOLLAR, RIGHT?
50% OVERCHARGE EACH WAY AND
SO A DOLLAR.
THE CLAIM I DID THAT BECAUSE
YOU USED WRONG GEOGRAPHICAL
AREA.
CORRECT.
WAS THAT THE BASIS OF THE
ARGUMENT?
THEY ARGUED IT'S GOT TO BE
THE BROWARD COUNTY BUS IS THE
ONLY MEASURE.
SO THEY HAVE A MICRO APPROACH
TO THE CASE WHICH IS YOU PUT
ANY DOUBT ABOUT GRAPHIC AREA
OUT OF THE PICTURE.
ANY DOUBT ABOUT WHAT PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION MEANS OUT OF THE
PICTURE.
ANY DOUBT ABOUT PREVAILING
RATE.
IT MUST BE THE BROWARD COUNTY
BUS FARE.
JUDGE CARNEY CORRECTLY OBSERVED
IN HIS JUDGMENT THAT IS ONLY
THEORY WHICH THEY COULD WIN.
THAT'S IT.
BUT HAS THE 2006 AMENDMENT
TO THE STATUTE RESOLVED THIS
PROBLEM?
GOING FORWARD.
BUT NOT RETROACTIVELY FOR THIS
PERIOD WE'RE DEALING WITH.
WE'RE GRATEFUL THAT THE
LEGISLATURE FIXED IT FROM JULY
2006 FORWARD BUT THIS SUIT
RELATES TO A PERIOD PRIOR TO
THAT.
BUT THIS IS THE ONLY SUIT?
THE RECORD REFLECTS THERE
WERE SOME TEN, ALMOST TEN OTHER
CASES IN BROWARD COUNTY
BROUGHT.
ALL THESE CLASS ACTIONS AGAINST
OTHER LABOR POOL COMPANIES ALL
SEEKING TO ESSENTIALLY PUT THE
ENTIRE INDUSTRY OUT OF BUSINESS
OVER THIS EVENTUALTY WE HAVE
HERE AND THOSE CASES ARE ALL
STAYED AS A RESULT OF THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY RULING. IF THE
COURT WOULD UNDO THAT, THAT
WOULD RESURRECT PENDING CASES.
WHETHER THE EXACT NUMBER IS
EIGHT OR TEN BUT IT'S IN THE
RECORD.
YOU SAID AS I KNOW WE'RE UP
ON TIME BUT YOU SAID THERE WERE
LAWSUITS BROUGHT AN EFFORT TO
PUT THESE LABOR POOLS OUT OF
BUSINESS? IS THAT ON THE RECORD?
ABSOLUTELY, YOUR HONOR.
WE PUT ON A RECORD FROM OUR CFO
FROM OUR CEO AND FROM THE
FINANCIAL RECORDS ABOUT THE
DEVASTATING EFFECT.
THAT WASN'T THEIR, YOU'RE
SAYING IT WAS THEIR INTENT TO PUT YOU
OUT OF BUSINESS?
IT'S CONSEQUENCE.
I MAY HAVE MISSPOKE.
IS THE PUNITIVE CONSEQUENCE OF
WHAT THEY HAVE DONE.
MR.^LINER'S DAMAGES ALONE WOULD
TAKE 17% OF OTHER NET INCOME
FOR THE ENTIRE STATEWIDE
COMPANY.
AND WE PUT ON EVIDENCE THERE IS
1500 LABOR POOL PEOPLE LIKE HIM
COMING OUT OF THAT BROWARD
COUNTY LABOR HALL EACH YEAR WHO
WOULD ALL HAVE CLAIMS LIKE HIS.
177,000.
AND THERE IS 22,000 PEOPLE WE
HAVE STATEWIDE.
THOSE KIND OF NUMBERS WHEN OUR
NET INCOME AS IN THE RECORD WAS
ONLY A MILLION DOLLARS WOULD
ENTIRELY DESTROY OUR COMPANY,
EVEN IF A CLASS WASN'T
CERTIFIED.
IN THIS CASE WE GOT TO REMEMBER
WAS BROUGHT AS A CLASS ACTION.
WOULDN'T YOU AGREE THAT IF
THE FOURTH DISTRICT'S OPINION
IS AFFIRMED, THAT THE ISSUE AS
TO THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
SECTION 25 IS MOOT?
YES.
YES, YOU'VE GONE WELL BEYOND
YOUR TIME.
THANK YOU, JUDGE.
GIVE YOU A COUPLE MINUTES.
YOU'RE ALSO OVER YOUR TIME.
BALANCE THE TIME OUT.
I APPRECIATE IT.
CAN YOU SPEAK TO THIS ISSUE
OF THE DEFINITION OF PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION.
IT SEEMS LIKE YOU WANT TO US
DEFINE IT AS BUS SERVICE BUT, I
THINK YOU WOULD AGREE AT LEAST
THE COURT FOUND THAT BUS
SERVICE, ISN'T GOING GOING TO
GET YOU EVERYWHERE.
AT LEAST AT 60% OF THE TIME
IT'S NOT GOING TO GET YOU
DOOR-TO-DOOR.
AND THE STATUTE ITSELF SAYS, TO
AND FROM THE WORKSITE.
SO WHY CAN'T WE USE A MEASURE
OF OTHER METHODS OF PUBLICLY
SUBSIDIZE TRANSPORTATION, NOT
INCLUDING TAXIS LIMOS ANYTHING
LIKE THAT.
BECAUSE THE STATUTE, THIS IS
WHERE YOU'VE BEEN SLIGHTLY WITH
ALL DUE RESPECT MISLED.
STATUTE DOES NOT SAY TO AND
FROM THE WORKSITE.
IF YOU LOOK AT THE STATUTE
BEFORE YOU AND YOU LOOK AT
LANGUAGE IT TALKS ABOUT THE
CHARGE THAT THE EMPLOYER
IMPOSES TO AND FROM THE
WORKSITE AND THEN IF YOU LOOK
AT THE NEXT CLAUSE --
WHICH IS WHAT HE SAID.
TO AND FROM THE WORKSITE.
THAT'S THE CHARGE FROM THE
EMPLOYER.
BUT IF YOU LOOK AT NEXT CLAUSE,
WHAT IS IT COMPARED TO, NOT
COMPARED TO AND FROM WORKSITE
THAT IS OF CRITICAL IMPORTANCE.
BECAUSE IF YOU DO BELIEVE THAT
THE STATUTE IS LOOKING AT, WHAT
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION WOULD
CHARGE TO AND FROM, I REALIZE
JUSTICE BELL THAT IS JUST GOOD
COMMON SENSE.
IT IS.
IF I ACCEPT YOUR ARGUMENT
AND THE BUS IS 25 CENTS, FROM
POINT A TO POINT B, BUT THIS
DISTANCE IS MUCH BROADER, THEN,
IF WE ACCEPT YOUR ARGUMENT, 25
CENTS IS ALL THIS PERSON COULD
CHARGE?
IF THAT'S WHAT LEGISLATURE
SAID, THAT'S WHAT IT DID HERE
THAT IS TRUE.
I REALIZE THAT MIGHT BE BAD
LEGISLATION AND THERE WOULD BE
A DIFFERENT CONSTITUTIONAL
ATTACK IF THAT WERE, IF WE WANT
TO GO DOWN THAT PATH.
BUT THAT'S NOT WHAT THE
LEGISLATURE SAID.
WHAT STATUTORY DEFINITION OF
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION SUPPORTS
YOUR POSITION?
YOUR HONOR, I WOULD ADMIT
THE TRANSPORTATION WOULD
INCLUDE BUSES, AND TRAINS AND
MAYBE, ALTHOUGH WE DEBATED
THIS, MAYBE EVEN A VAN POOL ALL
THEIR EXPERTS SAID A VAN POOL
WOULDN'T WORK.
THE PROBLEM IS THE LANGUAGE
PREVAILING.
BECAUSE, YOU CANNOT EXCISE THAT
LANGUAGE FROM YOUR ANALYSIS.
YOU CANNOT READ THE TERMS APART
IT SAYS THE PREVAILING RATE FOR
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION IN
BROWARD COUNTY AND
UNFORTUNATELY PROBABLY JUST
ABOUT EVERYWHERE IN FLORIDA
THAT IS GOING TO BE THE BUS.
THAT'S WHY JUSTICE, WHY SENATOR
JONES SAID WE'RE LOOKING AT
BUS.
MAYBE SOMEWHERE IT WON'T BE A
BUS.
MAYBE TROLLEY IN SMALL
MUNICIPALITY.
WHAT DOES THE LEGISLATION
SAY NOW?
THE LEGISLATION NOW SAYS
1.50.
THIS JUST APPLIES TO THIS
LIMITED CIRCUMSTANCE?
THIS SPECIES OF CASES PENDING
IN BROWARD AND ONE OTHER SECOND
DCA BUT YOU CAN'T IGNORE THE
WORDS PREVAILING RATE.
IF IT SIMPLY SAID THE RATE FOR
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION THERE
MIGHT ABETTER ARGUMENT.
IT'S GOT TO BE THE ONE THAT IS
PREDOMINANT.
134 MILLION BUSES, TRIPS THAT
ARE DONE IN BROWARD.
HAVE TO BE PREDOMINANT FOR A
TYPE OF PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION
THAT WOULD GET YOU
DOOR-TO-DOOR.
BUT THE STATUTE DOESN'T SAY
TO DOOR PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION T
DOES NOT SAY THAT IF THEY
WANTED TO THEY COULD HAVE TAKEN
OFF THE LAST FOUR WORDS OF THE
STATUTE AND NOT SAID, IN THE
GEOGRAPHIC AREA.
THEY COULD HAVE CUT RIGHT
THERE.
BUT YOU SPOKE TO PURPOSE.
ISN'T IT REASONABLE TO ASSUME
THE PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATURE
IS TO MAKE SURE THAT THESE
PRIVATE POOLS DO NOT CHARGE
THESE LABORERS ANYMORE THAN IT
WOULD COST THEM OTHERWISE IF
THEY CHOSE TO USE PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION TO GET TO THE
JOB SITE?
NO.
THERE IS NOTHING --
ISN'T THAT REASONABLE.
THAT WOULD BE REASONABLE
THAT WOULD BE A GREAT LAW.
BUT THAT'S NOT WHAT THEY SAID.
WHAT THEY SAID, WAS --
TAKE IT EASY.
THEY SAID, THIS IS THE
BACKSTOP.
THAT'S WHAT THEY SAID.
IT WOULD BE A GREAT LAW TO SAY
PUBLIC TRANSPORTATION FOR THE
SAME TRANSPORTATION.
BUT THEY DIDN'T SAY THAT.
THEY SAID, LOOK OUTSIDE PUBLIC
TRANSPORTATION.
WE APPRECIATE YOUR PASSION
BUT --
THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
WE WANT TO MAKE SURE YOU GET
DOWN THE STEPS OKAY.
THANK YOU BOTH FOR YOUR
ARGUMENTS.
WE'LL TAKE THE CASE UNDER
ADVISEMENT.
THANK YOU, SIR.