In re: Amendments to Fla. Rules of Criminal Procedure
SC09-159
PLEASE RISE.
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, THE
FLORIDA SUPREME COURT.
PLEASE BE SEATED.
>> THE NEXT CASE ON THE COURT'S
AGENDA IS AMENDMENTS TO THE
FLORIDA RULES OF CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE.
>> CHIEF JUSTICE, GOOD MORNING.
TOM BATEMAN ON BEHALF OF THE
CRIMINAL PROCEDURES COMMITTEE.
I HAVE STARTED TO LOSE MY VOICE
YESTERDAY.
YOU BEAT UP ON ME SO BAD
YESTERDAY.
BUT I DON'T KNOW WHAT THE
PROBLEM IS.
BUT IF YOU CAN'T HEAR ME, THAT
HAS NEVER BEEN A PROBLEM BEFORE
BUT IF YOU CAN'T, PLEASE LET ME
REPEAT.
THIS IS THE BIG RULE PACKAGE,
THE THREE-YEAR CYCLE AND SO
THERE ARE A LOT OF ISSUES IN
IT.
>> AND THE COURT, THE REASON WE
SENT OUT REVISED ORDER --
>> CORRECT.
>> -- IN THESE RULES CASES AS YOU
CAN SEE A LITTLE UNMANAGEABLE,
TO TRY TO DIRECT IN COUPLE
SPECIFIC AREAS.
THANK YOU FOR FILING THE
AMENDED APPENDIX.
THAT HELPS.
>> WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO DO IF
IT IS PERMISSIBLE AND YOUR
AGREEABLE, ADDRESS THESE FOUR
THINGS AND LIKE TO TAKE THE
EASY ONES FIRST THE ONES I
THINK WILL GENERATE THE FEWEST
QUESTIONS BECAUSE THERE IS ONE
THAT MAY BE MORE CONTROVERSIAL.
AT LEAST I HOPE IT GENERATES
MORE THAN A FEW QUESTIONS, LET
ME PUT IT THAT WAY.
LET ME START WITH, IF I CAN,
THE ISSUE NUMBER THREE YOU
RAISE, WHY, OR THE COURT
RAISED, WHY IS THE COMMITTEE
PROPOSING BASED ON THE RULES OF
JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION A
CHANGE IN THE TITLE OF PART 7
ON THE DISQUALIFICATION AND
SUBSTITUTION OF THE JUDGE?
WHAT I WOULD JUST LIKE TO DO IS
JUST SHOW YOU THAT PART 7 SAYS,
DISQUALIFICATION AND
SUBSTITUTION OF JUDGE.
THERE IS ONE RULE IN THAT PART.
AND IT IS SUBSTITUTION OF
THE JUDGE.
THE RULE DOESN'T ADDRESS
ANYTHING TO DO WITH
DISQUALIFICATION.
SO THE TERM DISQUALIFICATION --
>> REALLY NOT BASED ON THE
RULES OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION?
>> WELL --
>> RULES OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION TALK ABOUT
DISQUALIFICATION.
>> THAT'S THE REASON.
BECAUSE IT IS COVERED IN THERE
WE TOOK IT OUT OF OUR RULES.
>> THEN YOU PUT THAT POINT
IN.
>> THAT IS ONLY REASON FOR
TAKING IT OUT OF THE TITLE
BECAUSE DISQUALIFICATION --
>> DOESN'T CONFORM --
>> CORRECT.
IF YOU LOOK IN THE RULE OF
DISQUALIFICATION THERE IS
NOTHING THERE.
SO WE TOOK IT OUT SO IT WASN'T
CONFUSING.
NUMBER FOUR, WHY IS THE
COMMITTEE PROPOSING AMENDEDDING
REMOVING AFFIDAVIT OF INDIGENCY
FROM THE FORMS?
NOW AGAIN, I WANT YOU TO RECALL
THIS STARTED LONG AGO.
THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE AFTER THE
2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE 2752.
WHICH REQUIRES THE CLERKS
ASSOCIATION TO PREPARE THE
AFFIDAVIT AND KEEP IT
UP-TO-DATE AND SUBMIT IT TO THE
SUPREME COURT FOR APPROVAL.
SO, WHEN THAT HAPPENED, THIS
CAME TO THE COMMITTEE AS A
LEGISLATIVE, ONE OF THOSE
LEGISLATIVE ISSUES AFTER THE
LEGISLATION WAS PASSED AND
BECAUSE THE CLERKS ASSOCIATION
IS NOW RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING
THAT RULE UP-TO-DATE, THE
COMMITTEE FELT THAT IT SHOULD
BE TAKEN OUT OF OUR RULES.
>> I MEAN THE PROBLEM IS, IF IT
IS NOT THERE --
>> WHERE IS IT?
>> AND WE JUST APPROVED IT.
SO YOU DON'T HAVE, IF WE MAKE
IT CLEAR IN THE OPINION THAT
THE COMMITTEE DOESN'T HAVE THE
RESPONSIBILITY FOR KEEPING IT
UP, WILL THAT BE --
>> THAT WAS MY POINT.
BECAUSE IN JANUARY YOU ACTUALLY
APPROVED THE NEW FORM.
>> RIGHT.
>> AND IT REALLY THE ISSUE IS
MOOT RIGHT NOW.
>> OKAY.
>> SO THAT WAS AGAIN, THAT WAS
LONG AGO AND IT'S TAKEN CARE
OF.
SHOULD RULE 3.172(D).
WHICH IS WHAT THE JUDGE'S
RESPONSIBILITY ON ACCEPTING A
PLEA, THIS HAS TO DO WITH A DNA
INQUIRY WHICH WE WERE HERE
BEFORE, YOU SOME OF YOU RECALL
A FEW YEARS AGO CAME
HERE INQUIRING ABOUT DNA.
WHAT WE HAVE PROPOSED IS A,
UNDER 341.91 AN EXTENSION OF
SPEEDY TRIAL IF IT BECOMES
KNOWN AT THE TIME OF THE PLEA
COLIQUY THAT THERE IS THE
POTENTIAL OF DNA, OF EVIDENCE
EXISTING THAT CONTAINS DNA THAT
COULD EXONERATE THE DEFENDANT.
>> SO EITHER, YOUR PROPOSAL
WOULD ALLOW THE STATE OR THE
DEFENSE TO GET THIS TESTED AND
HAVE AN EXTENSION OF SPEEDY
TRIAL?
>> EXTENSION OF SPEEDY TRIAL.
IN FACT --
>> WHEN YOU SAY EXTENSION
REFERRING TO TOLLING SPEEDY
TRIAL?
>> IF SPEEDY TRIAL, I THINK IT
REALLY, PERHAPS, TOLLING WOULD
BE, BECAUSE SPEEDY TRIAL MAY
NOT HAVE RUN AT THE TIME THE
PLEA IS ENTERED.
BUT THE TESTING, I MEAN THE
TIME MAY RUN -- OR DO WE EXTEND
IT.
I GUESS TOLLING MIGHT BE THE
BETTER TERM.
>> DIDN'T THE STATUTE
CONTEMPLATE THAT THIS WOULD BE,
IF IT'S DONE ON THE DEFENDANT'S
BEHALF IT WOULD BE ON THE
MOTION OF THE DEFENDANT.
THE IDEA THAT COULD WAIT UNTIL
THE TIME OF CLOSE TO TRIAL AND
SAY, OH, THERE'S SOME DNA
EVIDENCE WE FORGOT THAT MIGHT
HELP THE DEFENDANT.
NOW WE WANT TO, JUST HAVE AN
AUTOMATIC TOLLING THEMSELVES,
AREN'T THERE TWO DIFFERENT
VALUES INVOLVED?
>> WELL THERE MAY BE BUT THE
RULE, 3.172(D) NOW RECOGNIZES
AND SAYS THAT THE JUDGE MUST
INQUIRE OF THE DEFENDANT AND
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENDANT AND
THE STATE.
THE DEFENDANT, THE ATTORNEYS
FOR BOTH PARTIES, IF THIS
EVIDENCE EXISTS AND THEN, IF IT
DOES EXIST, KNOWN TO EXIST,
UPON MOTION OF COUNSEL AND
COUNSEL IS USED, I BELIEVE, IN
MORE THAN ONE, MEANING MORE
THAN ONE.
CAN BE THE DEFENSE OR THE
STATE.
THE COURT MAY POSTPONE THE
PROCEEDING IN AND ORDER DNA
TESTING.
>> WHAT IS THIS RULE NUMBER?
>> RULE 3.172(D).
AND THAT IS DNA EVIDENCE
INQUIRY.
I WAS HERE, I'VE BEEN ON THIS
COMMITTEE SIX YEARS.
I'VE BEEN CHAIR TWICE.
I DON'T KNOW HOW THAT HAPPENED.
THAT USUALLY DOESN'T HAPPEN BUT
THE LAST TIME I WAS CHAIR --.
>> PROPOSED LANGUAGE WAS IN
3.191(I)4.
>> CORRECT. SPEEDY TRIAL.
>> WHATEVER WE DO IN THAT RULE
SHOULD BE CONFORMED TO THE PLEA
RULE.
BUT THE BASIC ISSUE IS, THAT
THE PUBLIC DEFENDERS HAVE BEEN
CONCERNED ABOUT, THE CAN
EXTENSION OR TOLLING BE DONE IN
THE MOTION IS BEING MADE BY THE
STATE, WHY SHOULD THAT BE
CHARGEABLE TO THE DEFENDANT?
>> WELL, I --
>> I THINK THAT, MAYBE --
>> I THINK THAT MADE BE THE
ARGUMENT BUT WE HAVE TO GO
BACK, WE HAVE TO GO BACK WITH
THE WHOLE ARGUMENT WE HAVE
ABOUT DNA AND THE
RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
COURT TO MAKE SURE SOMEONE
WHO IS NOT GUILTY, SHOULD HAVE
THE ABILITY TO SHOW THAT THEY
SHOULD BE EXONERATED.
WE HAVE TO GO BACK TO THAT
ARGUMENT BECAUSE THAT IS WHAT
THIS IS ALL ABOUT,
THE DNA ISSUE.
IF IT IS RESPONSIBILITY OF THE
COURT AND IT COMES OUT THAT
THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE, NOW,
THE DISCOVERY RULES REQUIRE, IN
FACT, THAT'S ANOTHER RULE
PROPOSED THAT IN THE DISCOVERY
NOW EARLY ON THE STATE IS
SUPPOSED TO SUBMIT AND TELL THE
OTHER SIDE IF THE EVIDENCE
EXISTS.
SO MAY BECOME A MOOT ISSUE TOO.
>> CAN THE WHOLE MATTER JUST BE
RESOLVED BY NOT CHARGING --
THROUGH EITHER SIDE AND JUST
TOLLING THE SPEEDY TRIAL PERIOD
UNTIL THE DNA TEST --
>> THAT'S WHAT I THINK --
>> NOBODY LOSES THERE.
>> NOBODY LOSES.
THAT'S WHY WE PUT IT IN THE
SPEEDY TRIAL.
WE DIDN'T, WE JUST SAID IT
WOULD BE EXTENDED FOR PURPOSE
OF THE DNA INQUIRY.
I DON'T THINK IT, I DON'T THINK
IT SHOULD BE, I THINK IT SHOULD
BE, PERSONALLY I THINK THE
JUDGE OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO DO
THAT AND IT SHOULDN'T HAVE TO
BE BY THE DEFENSE ATTORNEY
BECAUSE IT WOULD BE CONSIDERED,
I GUESS A WAIVER, THEY WOULD
HAVE TO WAIVE SPEEDY TRIAL.
BUT THE JUDGE SEES THAT THERE
IS THE POTENTIAL FOR EVIDENCE
TO EXONERATE THIS DEFENDANT,
THEN THE COURT OUGHT TO BE ABLE
TO DO IT AND NOT VIOLATE THE
DEFENDANT'S STATUTORY RIGHTS OF
SPEEDY TRIAL.
I DON'T THINK IT IS A
CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATION.
>> IN THE STATUTE THOUGH, I
KNOW THERE HAVE BEEN TIMES WE
SAID WE DON'T WANT YOU TO TRACK
THE STATUTE.
>> YES.
>> THE STATUTE DOES SAY THE
PROCEEDING ON THE DEFENDANT'S
BEHALF AN ORDER DNA TESTING
UPON MOTION OF COUNSEL
SPECIFYING THE PHYSICAL
EVIDENCE TO BE TESTED.
THAT'S ACTUALLY IN THE STATUTE.
WHY SHOULDN'T THAT BE IN THE
RULE BECAUSE ALTHOUGH THAT MAY
BE A PROCEDURAL WAY THAT IT'S
BEING STATED, IT REFLECTS THE
ACTUAL STATUTORY LANGUAGE IN
SECTION 925.12(2)?
>> ONLY THING I CAN SAY TO
THAT, JUSTICE PARIENTE, THE
MEMBERS OF THIS COMMITTEE HAVE
GENERALLY BEEN MORE CONCERNED,
WHAT IS BEING DONE IS DONE FOR
THE RIGHT REASONS.
IF NOBODY WANTS AN INNOCENT
DEFENDANT TO BE FOUND GUILTY.
NOT EVEN LET THEM PLEAD.
I THINK THAT'S REALLY THE
PHILOSOPHICAL PART OF IT.
>> BUT, I'M HAVING TROUBLE
UNDERSTANDING THIS.
BECAUSE WHAT IF THE CONTEST
SAYS I DON'T WANT IT.
THEY DON'T WANT TO TEST IT.
HE MAY NOT WANT TO TEST IT
BECAUSE IT MAY SHOW HE IS
GUILTY?
>> HE MAY NOT.
THAT IS EXACTLY RIGHT.
BUT THE QUESTION, IS THERE
EVIDENCE --
>> THE ROLE OF THE COURT IN
DECIDING, YOU KNOW, HOW TO
HANDLE THESE EVIDENTIARY
MATTERS ON ITS OWN INITIATIVE
JUST STRIKES ME AS A LITTLE
ODD.
>> WELL, AGAIN, THE RULE, THE
RULES, AS IT CURRENTLY EXISTS,
THIS IS THE FLEE COLIQUY RULE,
REQUIRES THE JUDGE TO ASK NOT
ONLY THE DEFENDANT, BUT THE
ATTORNEY FOR THE DEFENDANT AND
THE ATTORNEY FOR THE STATE IF
THIS EVIDENCE EXISTS THAT MIGHT
CONTAIN DNA AND THEN IT SAYS,
ON MOTION, UPON MOTION OF
COUNSEL.
DOESN'T SAY DEFENSE COUNSEL.
JUST SAYS UPON MOTION OF
COUNSEL. SO --
>> IS THIS COMMITTEE
CONTEMPLATING I'M A PERSON
THAT LIKES THE WHOLE PICTURE.
I ASK THE STATE IS THERE DNA?
YES THERE IS.
WAS IT TESTED, NO.
I'M THINKING I DON'T WANT THIS
CASE GOING ON TWO YEARS LATER,
THREE YEARS LATER.
YOU'RE SAYING I AS THE JUDGE
COULD ORDER THIS TESTING BE
DONE BEFORE I ACCEPT THE PLEA?
>> I THINK --
>> IS THAT WHAT THE RULE IS
INTENDING TO DO?
>> I THINK A JUDGE COULD SAY IF
THERE'S A POSSIBILITY OF
EVIDENCE EXISTING THAT CONTAINS
DNA THAT EXONERATES THIS
DEFENDANT, NOW YOU HAVE TRIAL
JUDGES ON YOUR COURT NOW, I
SUGGEST, THAT MOST JUDGES ARE
GOING TO SAY IF THAT
POSSIBILITY EXISTS I'M NOT
GOING TO ACCEPT A PLEA.
I MIGHT BE WRONG ABOUT THAT BUT
I THINK, I WOULD BE INQUIRING
OF THOSE LAWYERS AND THAT
DEFENDANT, I WOULD BE SPENDING
A WHOLE LOT OF TIME TALKING
ABOUT THAT AND I WOULD SUGGEST
THAT MOST, IN MOST
CIRCUMSTANCES THAT EVIDENCE IS
GOING TO GET TESTED.
NOW, IT MAY BE THAT THE
DEFENDANT --
>> IS IT DIFFERENT FOR THE PLEA
SITUATION THAN FOR THE TRIAL
SITUATION?
BECAUSE I THINK THAT, I CAN SEE
DIFFERENT VALUES BEING INVOLVED
WITH THE PLEA.
>> CORRECT.
>> SO WE'RE PUTTING THEM THE
TWO TOGETHER.
I'M MORE CONCERNED, I GUESS IN
CASE WHERE THE DEFENDANT IS
READY TO GO TRIAL.
JUDGE ALLOWED, SAYING NOW
BEFORE SOME SOMEONE IS GOING TO
GO TO TRIAL.
THAT HE IS GOING.
HE IS SHE IS GOING TO ORDER
EVERYTHING BEING, DNA TESTING,
EVEN IF IT IS NOT, YOU KNOW,
THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT IT IS
ACTUALLY HELPFUL TO THE
DEFENDANT?
>> THERE WOULD BE NO WAY FOR
THE -- YES, WE NOW PUT IN DISCOVERY OF
RULE.
STATE IS NOW OBLIGATED
TO THE IDENTIFY THOSE,
THAT EVIDENCE MIGHT CONTAIN DNA.
THEY'RE OBLIGATED UNDER ANOTHER
PROVISION WE SUGGESTED TO DO
THAT NOW.
>> DO YOU INTEND TO ADDRESS,
THE 3.132?
YOU'RE WELL INTO YOUR REBUTTAL.
THAT IS THE ONE CONCERNING
WHETHER OR NOT THE, AT THE
PRETRIAL DETENTION, THAT THE
JUDGE --
>> I WAS.
>> -- MAKES A DETERMINATION EVEN
IF THE --
>> I THINK THIS IS PROBABLY THE
HOTTEST ISSUE AND PROBABLY MOST
CONTROVERSIAL, FROM, THE,
COMMON STANDPOINT AND OURS.
BUT I WILL MAKE A COUPLE OF
OBSERVATIONS.
THEN I'M GOING TO SIT DOWN.
>> THE STATUTE, 907.041.
TRIAL DETENTION AND RELEASE
STATUTE HAS TWO SEPARATE
PROVISIONS IN IT.
ONE PROVISION UNDER (4)B,
SAYS THAT.
NO PERSON CHARGED WITH A
DANGEROUS CRIME AND THEY'RE
LISTED, 22 OF THEM SHALL BE
GRANTED NON-MONETARY PRETRIAL
RELEASE AT A FIRST APPEARANCE
HEARING.
THEN, 4-C, SAYS THE COURT MAY
ORDER PRETRIAL DETENTION, IF IT
FINDS, A SUBSTANTIAL
PROBABILITY BASED ON THE
DEFENDANT'S PAST AND PRESENT
PATTERNS OF BEHAVIOR, ANY OF
THE FOLLOWING CIRCUMSTANCES
EXIST.
>> THIS IS, AND I KNOW YOU,
HAVE SOME COMMENTS, THEY HAVE
VERY SHORT TIME.
YOU'RE ENGAGING IN STATUTORY.
>> HAVE HELD CONTRARY TO WHAT
THE PROPOSED RILE IS?
>> WE RELIED MOSTLY, THE
REASON THIS CAME TO THE
COMMITTEE, IT WAS SENT PURSUANT
TO HO, VERSUS STATE, FIFTH DCA
CASE.
CONCURING OPINION BY JUDGE
SEWIA.
IT CAME, THERE WAS A LOT OF
DISCUSSION ON THIS INTEREST
WENT THROUGH, TOOK A LONG TIME
FOR THIS TO GET RESOLVED.
ULTIMATELY IT WAS, WHAT WE
PROPOSED WAS, APPROVED 19-3.
>> ACTUALLY, I WANT TO COMMEND
YOU THAT, MOST OF THESE RULES
LOOK LIKE GOT ALMOST
UNANIMITY.
>> VERY CLOSE, VERY CLOSE.
THE ONES THAT WERE MORE, THAT
NEEDED TO COME THROUGH QUICKER,
MORE QUICKLY, WE FILED THOSE
OUT OF CYCLE AND THAT'S WHY
I'VE BEEN COMMENTING.
IT WAS APPROVED 30-0 BY THE
BOARD OF GOVERNORS.
THERE'S A GAP.
THERE'S A GAP.
THE STATUTE SAYS THAT THE STATE
MAY FILE A MOTION.
NOW, LET ME JUST SAY, AS A
PRACTICAL MATTER, BECAUSE I
WANT, I THINK YOU NEED TO
UNDERSTAND THIS.
THE ATTORNEYS THAT APPEAR, AT
FIRST APPEARANCE ARE GENERALLY
NOT, THE ATTORNEYS, LIKE
MR.^MORRISON AND, MR.^GIFFORD.
THEY ARE CERTIFIED LEGAL
INTERNS.
THEY ARE JUVENILE LAWYERS.
THEY ARE BRAND NEW ATTORNEYS AT
BOTH PUBLIC DEFENDERS IN THE
STATE ATTORNEY'S OFFICE.
THE JUDGE, AT THOSE FIRST
APPEARANCE PROCEEDINGS, HAS
MUCH MORE KNOWLEDGE AND
EXPERIENCE WITH THESE THINGS
THAN THE LAWYERS DO THERE.
AND THE LAWYERS, THERE'S VERY
LITTLE INFORMATION PROVIDED TO
THE COURT AT FIRST APPEARANCE
EXCEPT THE ARREST AFFIDAVITS
AND SOME OTHER INFORMATION, THE
PRETRIAL RELEASE PEOPLE GET
TOGETHER.
IF THE JUDGE ALLOWS A PERSON TO
BE RELEASED, ALL WE'RE SAYING
IF THE MOTION IS NOT FILED, AND
IT HAS TO BE FILED BY FIRST
APPEARANCE OR IT CAN BE FILED
LATER, BUT UNDER THIS STATUTE
IT GENERALLY IS PRACTICALLY IS
NOT GOING TO HAPPEN.
THAT THE JUDGE SHOULD BE ABLE
TO LOOK AT THE CRITERIA, AND
MAKE THE CRITERIA IF THE MOTION
IS NOT FILED OR IF A MOTION IS
FILED, IT IS LEGALLY
INSUFFICIENT, THEN THE JUDGE
OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO GO AHEAD
FORWARD WITH FIRST APPEARANCE,
USING CRITERIA IN THE -- PART
OF THE RULE.
>> MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT,
JOHN MORRISON ON BEHALF OF THE
FLORIDA PUBLIC DEFENDERS
ASSOCIATION.
I WOULD BE REMISS IF I DID NOT
THANK THE COMMITTEE FOR ALL ITS
HARD WORK IN THIS TRIANNUAL
REVISIONS AND THE FACT THAT WE
HAVE ISSUES ONLY WITH A VERY
FEW OF THEIR PROPOSALS I THINK
SPEAKS VOLUMES FOR EVERYTHING
THEY HAVE DONE.
LET ME JUST ADDRESS, HOWEVER,
THE RULE 3.132 WHICH WE WERE
JUST DISCUSSING.
THE ISSUE OF PRETRIAL
DETENTION.
I BELIEVE THAT THE PROPOSED
RULE VIOLATES BOTH THE STATUTE
AND JUDICIAL NEUTRALITY.
THE STATUTE, SPECIFICALLY SAYS
THAT FILING OF THIS WILL BE
DONE BY THE STATE ATTORNEY.
I'M QUOTING FROM 907.041.4,
SUB E.
PRIOR TO FILING BY THE STATE
ATTORNEY SEEKING PRETRIAL
DETENTION.
SUB F HAS THE EXACT SAME LANGUAGE.
HEARING SHALL BE HELD WITHIN
FIVE DAYS OF FILING BY THE
STATE ATTORNEY OF COMPLAINT
SEEKING PRETRIAL DETENTION.
WHAT I HEARD THE COMMITTEE
ESSENTIALLY SAYING THAT THE
ADVERSARIAL SYSTEM HAS BROKEN
DOWN AND THAT SORT OF
INQUESTIONS TERRYAL SYSTEM
NEEDS TO BE PUT IN PLACE AND
THERE IS GAP.
THE GAP HEAR IS THE DISCRETION
OF THE STATE ATTORNEY, OF THE
EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO MAKE A
DECISION WHETHER OR NOT TO FILE
A MOTION FOR PRETRIAL
DETENTION.
THAT IS A GAP THAT SHOULD BE
THERE.
THAT'S SEPARATION OF POWERS AND
THAT'S THE SECOND PART OF THIS.
WHEN A JUDGE STEPS OUT OF THE
ROLE OF A NEUTRAL ARBITRATOR
AND, SAYS, MR.^DEFENDANT, I
THINK YOU SHOULD BE KEPT IN
JAIL, THAT IS NOT, AND THEN,
AND, I GET TO DECIDE, NOW
HAVING MADE THAT MOTION I GET
TO NOW DECIDE WHETHER THAT'S A
VALID MOTION AND WHETHER THE
STATUTORY ELEMENTS HAVE BEEN
MET, AND THE STATE HAS MET ITS
BURDEN OF PROOF AS REQUIRED
UNDER THE STATUTE AND THE
RULES.
>> IS THERE ANYTHING THAT
PREVENTS THE JUDGE, IF THE
JUDGE SEES THAT THE MOTION
HASN'T BEEN FILED, DEALING WITH
INEXPERIENCED PROSECUTOR, I
KNOW IN SOME STATES, SOME
CIRCUITS NOW, THEY'RE GETTING
CIVIL LAWYERS TO COME IN TO
HELP OUT BECAUSE THE PROBLEMS,
IS THERE ANYTHING THAT WOULD
STOP A JUDGE FROM ASKING THE
SPECIFIC QUESTION TO THE
ASSISTANT STATE ATTORNEY, IS
THERE SOME REASON A MOTION FOR
PRETRIAL DETENTION HAS NOT BEEN
FILED?
I MEAN THAT --
>> NO, YOUR HONOR.
I HEAR IT ALL THE TIME.
JUDGE, USUAL WAY IT IS PHRASED,
STATE, WILL YOU BE FILING A
MOTION FOR PRETRIAL DETENTION?
ANY LAWYER WHO CAN NOT READ
BETWEEN THE LINES OF THAT
STATEMENT, FRANKLY, SHOULD NOT
BE A LAWYER.
AND, IN ADDITION TO THAT, EVEN
ON THE APPELLATE LEVEL, EVEN IF
THE MOTION IS NOT FILED, IT
GOES UP ON A HABEAS CORPUS, THE
DISTRICT COURTS HAVE BEEN VERY
GENEROUS GRANTING HABEAS CORPUS
BUT GIVING THE STATE ATTORNEY
STILL MORE TIME TO FILE THE
APPROPRIATE MOTION.
IF THE STATE ATTORNEY BELIEVES
THEY CAN MEET THE STATUTORY
ELEMENTS.
AND THERE'S LISTED 1-7.
I CERTAINLY WON'T REITERATE
THEM FOR THE COURT.
BUT IF THE STATE ATTORNEY
BELIEVES THEY CAN SHOULDER THE
BURDEN OF PROOF THERE.
AND I BELIEVE THAT THAT IS THE
APPROPRIATE SEPARATION OF
POWERS.
THAT, THAT'S UP TO THE
EXECUTIVE AND THE OTHERS FOR --
>> YOU SAID THAT, IN YOUR VIEW
IT VIOLATES THE STATUTE.
IT ACTUALLY VIOLATES
STATUTORY LANGUAGE.
HAS THE APPELLATE COURT SPOKEN
ON THIS ISSUE AND ACTUALLY HELD
IT DOES REQUIRE A MOTION
OF THE --
>> YES.
>> I GUESS THERE WAS ONE
CONCURRING OPINION THAT --
>> ONE CONCURRING OPINION BY
ONE JUDGE OUT OF, I CAN'T, I
DON'T REMEMBER HOW MANY CASES
THAT I CITED BUT, OTHERWISE,
UNANIMITY WITHIN THE -- THAT
REALLY, THE HO CONCURING
OPINION -- THE HO CONDITION IS
OUT LAYER.
>> I GUESS WITH OUR OPINION,
USUALLY BALANCED NO RULES COME
OUT AT LEAST WHEN WE SEND
THINGS OVER, THIS IS VOTE BY
COMMITTEE OF 19-3.
JUST FROM THE DEFENDANT'S POINT
OF VIEW, IS THERE ANYTHING
ELSE, BECAUSE YOU MADE A VERY
COMPELLING ARGUEMENT THIS WOULD
BE IMPROPER INCURSION INTO
SOMETHING THE JUDGE SHOULD NOT
BE DOING.
BUT ON THE OTHER HAND,
MR.^BATEMAN SEEMS TO ALSO MAKE
A POINT.
SO IS THERE ANY OTHER NUANCES
THAT WE'RE MISSING ON THIS AS
FAR AS, YOU KNOW THIS BEING,
QUOTE A GOOD IDEA OR HOW THIS
GOT --
>> WELL, WHETHER, I BELIEVE,
WITH ALL DUE RESPECT TO THE
COMMITTEE, THE GOOD IDEA WHAT
THEY'RE REALLY SAYING IS, GEE,
IT WOULD BE A GOOD IDEA IF THE
STATE ATTORNEYS DID THEIR JOB
BETTER AND IF NOT, THE JUDGES
SHOULD STEP IN.
AND --
>> LET ME ASK YOU.
SEEMS TO ME THAT FIRST
APPEARANCES THINGS ARE
HAPPENING VERY QUICKLY AND
JUDGE IS USUALLY GOING THROUGH
40 OR 50 CASES IN ONE
AFTERNOON.
WHAT, THE JUDGE IS PERMITTED TO
LOOK AT FACTORS SUCH AS TIES TO
THE COMMUNITY, FAMILY IN THE
AREA, JOBS, IN DETERMINING THE
AMOUNT OF BOND.
AND THE JUDGE CAN LOOK AT THOSE
FACTORS WITH WHETHER THE STATE
ATTORNEY RAISED IT OR NOT.
>> YES, SIR.
>> SO IF A JUDGE IS ABLE TO DO
THAT AND THAT DOES NOT VIOLATE
NEUTRALITY IN THE JUDGE, THEN
WHY CAN'T THE JUDGE LOOK AT
FACTS OF THE CASE AND THE
PERSON'S BACKGROUND IN
DETERMINING WHETHER OR NOT THE
FACTORS IN THE DETENTION
STATUTE APPLY?
HOW IS THAT SO OFFENSIVE?
>> I APOLOGIZE FOR STEPPING
OVER YOUR HONOR.
I BELIEVE THIS GOES BACK TO THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
THERE IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO PRETRIAL RELEASE, UNLESS
CERTAIN FACTORS ARE SHOWN.
IT IS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO
REASONABLE PRETRIAL RELEASE.
THE JUDGE, IN CONSIDERING THOSE
FACTORS, THAT IS THE 1.31(B),
CAN MAKE THE WHOLE SMORGASBOARD
OF POSSIBLE THINGS THEY CAN SET
AND FACTORS THEY NEED TO LOOK
AT.
THAT'S ALL PERFECTLY
PERMISSIBLE.
THAT IS WHAT THE JUDGE JUST
SETTING A REASONABLE BOND BASED
ON THIS INDIVIDUAL PERSON.
IT'S ANOTHER THING COMPLETELY
TO SAY YOU, SIR, YOU, MA'AM,
DEFENDANT, DO NOT GET A BOND AT
ALL BECAUSE YOU ARE TOO
DANGEROUS TO BE RELEASED.
THAT IS TAKING AWAY THAT
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT.
THAT REQUIRES A SHOWING.
THAT REQUIRES AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING.
AND, IT IS AT THAT POINT WHERE
IT IS JUST INAPPROPRIATE FOR A
JUDGE TO BE INSERTING
THEMSELVES INTO, ESSENTIALLY AN
EVIDENTIARY MATTER.
AND STRIPPING THE RIGHT, AS
OPPOSED TO SETTING REASONABLE
BOND.
IF YOUR HONOR'S QUESTION IS CAN
THEY EFFECTIVELY SET NO BOND BY
SETTING HIGH ENOUGH BOND?
ABSOLUTELY.
THEY DO IT ALL THE TIME.
>> SEEMS TO ME ONE OF YOUR
BETTER, I THINK YOU MAKE SOME
GOOD ARGUMENTS.
I THOUGHT, IF WE'RE LOOKING AT
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, THE
FACT THAT 97041 DOESN'T SAY THE
COURT CAN DO IT ON ITS OWN
MOTION BUT SECTION 9.03471 WHEN
THERE IS VIOLATION OF THE
PRETRIAL RELEASE EXPRESSLY
ALLOWS THE COURT TO REVOKE BOND
ON ITS OWN MOTION.
SO, TO ME, WE'RE REALLY, THIS
IS ALWAYS A DANGEROUS AREA, IN
A RULES CASE, WE, USUALLY
ACCUSED OF LEGISLATING IN
SUBSTANTIVE CASE.
BUT YOU KNOW, IS THIS A MATTER,
I GUESS, OF, I DON'T KNOW IF IT
IS RAISED QUITE THIS WAY OF
PROCEDURE OR SUBSTANCE AS TO
WHO GETS TO MAKE THE MOTION?
>> WHO GETS TO MAKE A MOTION --
>> BECAUSE THIS IS GOING TO
COME UP NOW AND WE'RE GOING TO
TALK ABOUT DNA ISSUE.
MAYBE IT IS WHETHER THE JUDGE
UNDER A SITUATION IS, CAN SUA
SPONTE RAISE SOMETHING THAT
HASN'T BEEN RAISED BY EITHER
PARTY.
AND YOU'RE SAYING IT IS NOT
REALLY PROHIBITED BY STATUTE
BUT APPEARS THAT THE
LEGISLATURE DIDN'T INTEND FOR
THE JUDGE TO DO IT, BUT HOW
DOES THAT VIOLATE A STATUTE IF
THE JUDGE SAYS, I BELIEVE, I'M
GOING TO SUA SPONTE BRING THIS
UP.
STATE, GIVE ME THE REASON WHY?
>> THE GENERAL RULE OF
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION IS THAT
WHAT IS EXCLUDED IS NOT THERE.
>> I GUESS WHAT I'M SAYING,
SORT OF I'M SHIFTING A LITTLE
BIT, WE'RE DOING THIS AS IF IT
IS A RULE, WE'RE DOING A
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION BUT WHY
ISN'T THE ISSUE WHO GETS TO
BRING SOMETHING UP A MATTER OF
PROCEDURE?
>> I THINK THAT WOULD BE, YOUR
HONOR.
AND, I THINK, IT MAY, I THINK
THAT WOULD BE A LEGITIMATE
ARGUMENT.
AND MY, WISH FOR THIS COURT
WOULD BE THAT THIS COURT NOT
PUT JUDGES IN A POSITION OF
TAKING ADVERSARIAL POSITIONS TO
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS?
I THINK THAT IS A MATTER OF
PROCEDURE.
AND I THINK THIS COURT SHOULD,
SHOULD HUE TO THAT LINE
AND STEP ACROSS
AND BECOME QUASI-PROSECUTORS.
THAT IS INAPPROPRIATE AND
DEMEANS THE JUSTICE SYSTEM.
>> I WILL ADDRESS THIS ISSUE
ABOUT THE DNA TESTING OR IS
THAT WHAT YOU PREPARED --
>> I AM PREPARED ON THAT.
THE COURT SEEMS TO UNDERSTAND
MY ARGUMENTS QUITE WELL ON
THAT.
I WOULD MORE PREFER TO DEAL
WITH RULE 131 IF I MAY, THE
STAY AWAY ORDERS.
IF THAT IS ACCEPTABLE.
>> IS THAT A DIFFERENT RULE?
>> THIS IS DIFFERENT RULE.
THIS IS RULE 3.131.
>> THAT'S WHAT YOU'VE BEEN
TALKING ABOUT?
>> NO, I'VE BEEN TALKING ABOUT
132, YOUR HONOR, PRETRIAL
DETENTION.
>> PRETRIAL RELEASE.
>> ON THE DNA ISSUE.
>> OKAY.
>> CAN THE JUDGE OR SHOULD THE
JUDGE BE ABLE TO ON BEHALF OF
THE DEFENDANT ORDER DNA
TESTING?
>> NO, WHEN THE DEFENDANT
DOESN'T WANT IT.
AND THAT'S JUST, IF THE
DEFENDANT KNOWS THERE IS
TESTABLE MATERIAL, AND SOMEONE
SUGGESTED SOMETIMES DEFENDANTS
KNOW THAT A TEST IS NOT IN
THEIR BEST INTEREST, BUT A
PLEA, IMMEDIATE PLEA THAT WILL
NOT BE DELAYED BY THIS TESTING
IS IN THEIR BEST INTEREST, THE,
THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE THE
RIGHT TO WAIVE THAT, TO SAY NO,
I DON'T WANT THAT.
AND IT IS OFTEN, DNA HAS BEEN A
REAL BOMBSHELL IN THE COURTS
BECAUSE IT HAS SHOWN THAT SOME
PEOPLE WHO HAVE BEEN CONVICTED,
AND FOUND GUILTY THROUGH ALL
OUR BEST PROCEDURES WERE
ACTUALLY INNOCENT AND A REAL
WAKE-UP CALL TO US ALL.
BUT, AND HAS EXONERATED A LOT
OF PEOPLE'S LIBERTY.
WHEN DNA BECOMES A WAY TO
RESTRICTING SOMEONE'S LIBERTY,
YOU, DEFENDANT, MUST STAY
IN JAIL DEPENDING, WHERE OTHER
WISE YOU COULD PLEA OUT AND BE
RELEASED TODAY, THAT'S A
PROBLEM.
>> WELL THIS REALLY CAME OUT
ABOUT, AS YOU WERE AWARE NOT
ONLY CASES THAT ARE LITIGATED,
FULLY LITIGATED THE IMPORTANCE
OF DNA EVIDENCE BUT THE
EXPOSURE OF THOSE CASES IN
WHICH GUILTY PLEAS HAD BEEN
ENTERED.
AND THEN LATER DNA EVIDENCE
EXONERATED, SO IT CREATES THAT,
WHAT HAPPENS DOWN THE ROAD.
LET'S PLAY THIS ON OUT BECAUSE
IT COMES BACK ON COLLATERAL
REVIEW OR PETITIONS TO SET
ASIDE THE PLEA AND WITHDRAW THE
PLEA.
WHAT HAPPENS NOW?
SO THERE IS THIS MATERIAL.
AND THE DEFENDANT DOES NOT ASK
FOR IT AND THE JUDGE DOES NOT
ORDER.
PLAY IT ON OUT DOWN THE ROAD,
SHOULD HE DECIDE THAT HE WANTS
TO TEST LATER?
SEEMS TO ME IT JUST COMPLICATES
THIS COLLATERAL LOOK AT THESE
THINGS.
>> IT DOES COMPLICATE IT AND
YOU MIGHT RESULT, THERE MIGHT
RESULT IN MORE LITIGATION.
>> WOULDN'T THE ANSWER BE,
ISN'T THE COLIQUY TO SAY, JUDGE
FINDS OUT IF THERE IS DNA TO BE
TESTED, AND THEN INQUIRES ABOUT
WHAT IT IS, DOES, HAS IT BEEN
TESTED, AND DOESN'T THE
DEFENDANT THEN, I MEAN, AGAIN,
I'M NOT SURE IF THIS IS IN THE
COLIQUY BUT THE JUDGE SAYING,
YOU HAVE NOW AFFIRMED THERE IS
DNA TESTING.
ARE YOU SAYING THIS IS NOT
ANYTHING THAT YOU BELIEVE WOULD
EXONERATE YOU?
AND AT THAT POINT, WOULDN'T IT
BE A WAIVER FOR THAT DEFENDANT?
>> IT SEEMS TO ME THAT MOST
PRECIOUS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
WE HAVE ARE ALL WAIVEABLE.
>> BUT WHAT ABOUT THE SITUATION
WHERE, AGAIN WE'RE TALKING
ABOUT, THERE IS A LOT OF PEOPLE
BEING PUSHED THROUGH THE
SYSTEM, AND REALLY, DNA, YOU
KNOW, IF IT IS TESTED IT WOULD
SHOW INNOCENCE?
>> AND IT MIGHT.
BUT AT THE POINT WHERE
THE DEFENDANT IS MAKING A DECISION,
WE HAVE TO ULTIMATELY RESPECT
THAT PERSON'S DECISION.
MY DECISION, AND A LOT OF TIMES
DEFENDANTS ARE MAKING A
DECISIONS IF I PLEA TODAY, I
GET OUT TODAY AND THAT IS MORE
IMPORTANT TO ME.
>> SEEMS TO ME THAT IT COMES
BACK IN, YOU'RE STANDING THERE,
AS COUNSEL.
YOU DON'T KNOW WHAT IT'S GOING
TO SHOW.
SO YOU GIVE THIS ADVICE, DON'T
HAVE IT TESTED.
YET, SOMEWHERE DOWN THE ROAD,
HOW CAN YOU MAKE AND PROVIDE
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
AND KNOWING, WORKING AS COUNSEL
CONTEMPLATED BY THE SIXTH
AMENDMENT AND ALL THAT LANGUAGE
WE DEAL WITH EVERY DAY, THAT
THIS EXISTS, BUT I'M NOT GOING
TO DO IT?
>> THERE ARE SO MANY SITUATIONS
LIKE THAT IN THE LIFE OF A
PUBLIC DEFENDER, YOUR HONOR.
WHERE, QUITE FRANKLY YOU KNOW
NOTHING ABOUT CASES, AND YOU
HAVE A DUTY TO CONVEY A PLEA
OFFER.
OFTEN A PLEA OFFER FOR CREDIT
TIME SERVED FOR IMMEDIATE
RELEASE.
AND THERE IS ALWAYS THAT
ETHICAL PROBLEM.
AND IT IS NOT RESTRICTED TO
THIS RULE.
AND, -- WON'T BE SOLVED BY THIS
RULE.
>> YOU DON'T SEE THAT AS --
>> I SEE IT AS A HUGE PROBLEM,
YOUR HONOR, BUT JUST MORE THAN
ENDEMIC, SYSTEMIC PROBLEM.
THIS RULE IS NOT THE PLACE TO
SOLVE THAT.
I WOULD LOVE FOR THIS COURT TO
SOLVE THAT PROBLEM, QUITE
FRANKLY.
THAT IS THE BANE OF MY
EXISTENCE MOST DAY IS.
I HAVE 30 SECONDS LEFT.
IF I COULD, GET BACK TO RULE
131.
WE JUST ASK THAT THIS COURT
INDICATE IN ITS RULES THAT AT
FIRST APPEARANCE, A JUDGE CAN
CONSIDER, THE STATUTORY
LANGUAGE, GOOD CAUSE IS SHOWN
AND JUSTICE REQUIRE, DOESN'T
HAVE TO TRACK THE STATUTORY
LANGUAGE, THAT THE ENTIRE COURT
HAS THE DISCRETION TO NOT ORDER
STAY AWAY ORDER.
GENERALLY HAPPEN WHEN THE
ALLEGED VICTIMS COME INTO FIRST
APPEARANCE.
UNDER THE ONLY OTHER WAY TO
MODIFY THAT IS UNDER 3.131(D).
AND THAT --
>> YOU JUST WANT TO TRACK THE
STATUTE ON THAT ONE?
>> YES.
AND D REQUIRES A SUBSEQUENT
MOTION LATER THAT WOULDN'T
HAPPEN AT FIRST APPEARANCE.
WHICH IS FRUSTRATING FOR
EVERYONE INVOLVED AND DELAYS
THE PROCESS.
I HAVE RUN OUT OF TIME.
I THANK YOU FOR YOUR PATIENCE
AND YOUR ATTENTION THIS
MORNING.
>> MADAM CHIEF JUSTICE, MAY
HAVE ONE MINUTE TO ADDRESS A
COUPLE OF THINGS.
REGARDING THE DNA, JUSTICE
LEWIS HAS HIT RIGHT ON THE
POINT.
IF THIS COURT WERE TO OVERRULE
ALL THE DISTRICT COURT OF
APPEALS CASE THAT ALLOWS A
DEFENDANT TO CHALLENGE A PLEA
THAT YOU HAVE GONE THROUGH AND
DONE SO MUCH WORK ON, AND THEN
THEY GO IN AND THEY CHALLENGE
THAT PLEA, AND WE HAVE PLEA
WRITTEN OUT FORMS AND WE HAVE
TRANSCRIPTS AND HAVE ALL THIS
THING AND THEY'RE STILL
PERMITTED TO ATTACK THAT PLEA,
SAYING THAT THEY MADE IT
INVOLUNTARILY OR COERCED OR
FORCED OR SOMETHING LIKE THAT,
I WOULD BUY THAT ARGUMENT.
I THINK THAT WE ARE CONTINUE TO
CREATE THIS ISSUE.
IT WILL COME UP AGAIN AND SOME
COURT IS GOING TO SAY, THIS IS
IMPORTANT.
IF HE VIOLATES IT WE'LL ALLOW
IT.
>> GUY GETTING CREDIT FOR TIME
SERVED AND THE JUDGE DECIDES --
>> PRACTICAL, NO QUESTION.
NO QUESTION.
IT IS A REALLY PRACTICAL STICKY
WICKET.
AS TO THE PRETRIAL DETENTION,
THERE IS NO PLACE, I HAVE
SCOURED THIS STATUTE AND OUR
RULE PROVIDES THAT THE STATE
ATTORNEY MAY FILE THIS MOTION.
THERE IS NO REQUIREMENT THAT
THE STATE ATTORNEY FILE THE
MOTION.
THERE IS NOT EVEN REQUIREMENT
IN THE STATUTE THAT REQUIRES
THE STATE ATTORNEY TO FILE THE
MOTION.
BUT WHAT THE STATUTE DOES SAY
IS THAT THE LEGISLATIVE INTENT
OF THE PARTICULAR STATUTE IS
THAT PERSONS POSING A THREAT TO
THE SAFETY OF THE COMMUNITY
SHOULD NOT BE RELEASED AND IT
PUTS THE BURDEN ON THE COURT TO
DETERMINE PRETRIAL DETENTION IF
THE DEFENDANT AND UNDER 4(C)5,
IF THE DEFENDANT POSES A
THREAT TO THE COMMUNITY THE
COURT MAY SO CONCLUDE IF THAT
DEFENDANT APPEARS TO HAVE
COMMITTED A DANGEROUS CRIME AS
PUT IN THE STATUTE.
IT DOESN'T CRIER REQUIRE A
MOTION.
WE'RE TRYING TO FILL THAT CAP
BY THE RULE WHICH ALREADY
EXISTS.
>> THANK YOU VERY MUCH.
>> PERSONAL PRIVILEGE, LAST SIX
YEARS I'VE BEEN ON THE
COMMITTEE.
I CHAIRED IT TWICE.
THIS IS MY LAST APPEARANCE AS
CHAIR OF THAT COMMITTEE.
I'VE NOW BEEN APPOINTED TO
CIVIL RULES COMMITTEE AFTER
HAVING CHAIRED THE TRAFFIC
COMMITTEE.
I GUESS THEY WANT ME TO WREAK
HAVOC ON THE CIVIL RULES
COMMITTEE.
THANK Y'ALL VERY MUCH.
>> THANK YOU.
THANK YOU BOTH FOR YOUR
ARGUMENTS HERE TODAY.